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usa supported india's freedom -eyewitness account of the struggle between President Roosevelt & Churchill, over the fate of the post-war world
Why didn't the INA get integrated in the Indian Army after India got its ... https://www.quora.com/
Why didn't the INA get integrated in the Indian Army after India got its ...
https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-INA-get-integrated-in-the-Indian-Army-after-In...
Chief justice P.B. Chakrabarty
of Calcutta High Court, who had also served as the acting Governor of
West Bengal in India, disclosed the following in a letter ...
INA played a very important role in the
liberation of India from the british and those of who, think that INA
was a failure please read the following:-
Chief justice P.B. Chakrabarty of Calcutta High Court, who had also served as the acting Governor of West Bengal in India, disclosed the following in a letter addressed to the publisher of Dr. R.C. Majumdar's book A History of Bengal. The Chief Justice wrote:
Chief justice P.B. Chakrabarty of Calcutta High Court, who had also served as the acting Governor of West Bengal in India, disclosed the following in a letter addressed to the publisher of Dr. R.C. Majumdar's book A History of Bengal. The Chief Justice wrote:
In the preface of the book Dr. Majumdar has written that he could not accept the thesis that Indian independence was brought about solely, or predominantly by the non-violent civil disobedience movement of Gandhi. When I was the acting Governor, Lord Atlee, who had given us independence by withdrawing the British rule from India, spent two days in the Governor's palace at Calcutta during his tour of India. At that time I had a prolonged discussion with him regarding the real factors that had led the British to quit India. My direct question to him was that since Gandhi's "Quit India" movement had tapered off quite some time ago and in 1947 no such new compelling situation had arisen that would necessitate a hasty British departure, why did they have to leave? In his reply Atlee cited several reasons, the principal among them being the erosion of loyalty to the British Crown among the Indian army and navy personnel as a result of the military activities of Netaji. Toward the end of our discussion I asked Atlee what was the extent of Gandhi's influence upon the British decision to quit India. Hearing this question, Atlee's lips became twisted in a sarcastic smile as he slowly chewed out the word, "m-i-n-i-m-a-l!"[46]
Subhash Bose, Indian National Army and the Royal Navy mutiny
Subhash Bose, Indian National Army and the Royal Navy Uprising..
When Justice P.B. Chakrabarty, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court once asked the British PM Lord Clement Atlee – responsible for conceding India’s Independence, the all important question –
“what was the extent of Gandhi’s influence upon the British decision to quit India”
His response, with a smirk: “m-i-n-i-m-a-l!“
So, then why did they have to leave if the Quit India movement of 1942 had subsided and nothing major happened in the mainstream politics – then why did the British have to leave so suddenly in 1947??
Clement Atlee’s response:
Erosion of loyalty to the British Crown among the Indian army and navy personnel as a result of the military activities of Netaji
When Justice P.B. Chakrabarty, the Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court once asked the British PM Lord Clement Atlee – responsible for conceding India’s Independence, the all important question –
“what was the extent of Gandhi’s influence upon the British decision to quit India”
His response, with a smirk: “m-i-n-i-m-a-l!“
So, then why did they have to leave if the Quit India movement of 1942 had subsided and nothing major happened in the mainstream politics – then why did the British have to leave so suddenly in 1947??
Clement Atlee’s response:
Erosion of loyalty to the British Crown among the Indian army and navy personnel as a result of the military activities of Netaji
Who freed India? Gandhi or Bose?
Who freed India? Gandhi or Bose? : Mail Today, News - India Today
indiatoday.intoday.in › Mail Today
Jan 26, 2016 - ... New Delhi Attlee and then Governor of West Bengal Justice PB Chakraborty. ... "Toward the end of our discussion I asked Attlee what was the ...
'Netaji was responsible for India's independence from Britain and not ...
zeenews.india.com › India News
Jan 28, 2016 - ... Atlee and then Governor of West Bengal Justice PB Chakraborty in ... the end of our discussion I asked Attlee what was the extent of Gandhi's ...
Justice P.B. Chakraborty | sreenivasarao's blogs
https://sreenivasaraos.com/tag/justice-p-b-chakraborty/
Jan 14, 2016 - Posts about Justice P.B. Chakraborty written by sreenivasaraos. ... Toward the end of our discussion I asked Atlee what was the extent of ...
www.dimensiontoday.com/.../netaji-was-the-real-factor-that-had-led-the-british-to-qui...
Former British PM Clement Atlee had said that the role played by Netaji's Indian ... Atlee and then Governor of West Bengal Justice PB Chakraborty in 1956. ... of our discussion I asked Attlee what was the extent of Gandhi's influence upon the
How India got its Independence – The Real Story - Patheos
www.patheos.com/blogs/drishtikone/.../how-india-got-its-independence-real-story/
Royal Indian Navy Mutiny & India's struggle for Independence
Contribution of Royal Indian Navy Mutiny, of Bombay, towards India's struggle for Independence
Here is an untold story of the role of the Indian Navy in the Indian Freedom Struggle!The below article is courtesy: http://defence.pk/threads/royal-indian-navy-mutiny-which-gave-a-jolt-to-the-britishers.371051/
In one an extract from a letter written by P.V. Chuckraborty, former Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, on March 30 1976, reads thus: "When I was acting as Governor of West Bengal in 1956, Lord Clement Attlee, who as the British Prime Minister in post war years was responsible for India’s freedom, visited India and stayed in Raj Bhavan Calcutta for two days`85 I put it straight to him like this: ‘The Quit India Movement of Gandhi practically died out long before 1947 and there was nothing in the Indian situation at that time, which made it necessary for the British to leave India in a hurry. Why then did they do so?’ In reply Attlee cited several reasons, the most important of which were the INA activities of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India, and the RIN Mutiny which made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the British.
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Royal Indian Navy Mutiny was
another landmark in India's struggle for independence was the Royal
Indian Navy Mutiny of 1946. Before the outbreak of the World War II, the
Royal Indian Navy was formed being separated from the British Navy. The
English officers of the Navy always ill-treated the Indian junior
officers. There was a wide difference in salary between the British and
Indian officers. The condition of the Indian soldiers attached to the
Navy was miserable. They wanted to express their discontent.The chance came in February 1946. On the seashore of Bombay, some Indian naval personnel attached to the warship 'Tulare' were receiving training. The poor food supplied to them and the highhandedness of their officers led them to protest it and they expressed' it by displaying posters on the barrack walls containing the slogan 'Hindustan Sindbad', 'Englishmen leave India' etc.
The British officers suspected the Radio operator Data and imprisoned him. This led the navy personnel in the barracks to strike. Just by that time the I.N.A. Trial in the Red Fort had accused certain officers and soldiers. These naval personnel wanted to relieve immediately the officers and soldiers in the I.N.A.
The mutiny soon spread to other barracks. M.S. Khan became the head of the National Central Strike Committee.The mutineers demanded better food, equal pay for English and Indian naval officers and soldiers, release of I.N.A. officers, soldiers and political prisoners etc.
The Hindus and Muslims ironed out the differences among them and joined hands to make the strike a success. The tricolor, crescent and hammer and sickle-flags were together raised on the mast heads of the rebel ship 'Talwar'. When they returned to their barracks, they found them surrendered by the British soldiers on 21 February, 1946, when the rebelling Indian heavy personnel wanted to break the cur den, fighting took place between them and the British soldiers.
At this juncture, the civilian population Of Bombay offered favourable response to the mutiny. They supplied food and other requirements to the Indian navy personnel. The Communist Party of India in Bombay gave a clarion call of general strike. Congress socialist leaders like Arena Assar Ali and Asyut Palwardhan supported it with utmost vigor.
However surprisingly, the Congress and the Muslim League did not support it. The leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Jinnah and several others persuaded the mutineers to surrender when they headed the guidance of these leaders. However, the mill workers fully supported the cause of R.I.N. mutiny and a street-fighting took place between them and the police. By the repeated appeal of Patel and Jinnah, the mutineers finally surrendered on 23 February 1946.
With their surrender, the R.I.N. mutiny came to an end. It failed largely due to the desire of the British Government and some Indian leaders who immediately wanted to quell it. The net result was this that the British Government now took precaution not to flare up mutiny against His Majesty's Government.
The wide support to this mutiny by the public in Bombay clearly showed that a sense of hatred had developed fully in the mind of Indians towards the British rule. When one thinks about the R.I.N. ratings, one remembers the words of the Naval Central Strike Committee - "Our strike has been a historic event in the life of our nation. For the first time the blood of men in the services and in the streets flowed together in a common cause."
INDIAN NAVY MUTINY 1946 AND B.C.DUTT
Role of B.C.Dutt to build the foundation of RIN Mutiny of 1946
Role of B.C. Dutt as a conspirator
to build the foundation of The Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946
The
year 1757 marked the begning of British power in India. Bengal
was subjugated in June 1757, after the battle of Plassey. Plassey transferred
power to England
and the battle of Buxar in 1764 created rights.
The
sepoy mutiny of 1857 was the first armed struggle on a national scale against
British rule. The mutiny failed. The leaders of the mutiny were no match to the
iron-willed men of the east india
company. Eighty nine years later the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy rose in
revolt. They too failed. As for the cause that finally led to the mutiny we find only those records that
have been left behind by the foreign rulers. We also find the version given out
by the ratings in their evidence before the Enquiry Commission. No more for
their perspective rasons, all the three parties- the British rulers, the
ratings and the national leaders- made it appear as if the cooks of the Royal
Indian Navy caused the mutiny.
Like
the history of a people, the history of a movement can not be completed if one
is denied access to the diaries of the participants. History is more than mare
narration of bare facts. Behind the facts are the actors who willed the events.
Early
Life
B.C. Dutt,
full name Balai Chand Dutt was born in 1923 in a village
near Burdwan
town of West Bengal. In his childhood life he was not interested in
playing like other children but
fond of reading Historical books and Bengali Literature. He had read
almost all
the works of Rabindranath Tagore, Sarat Chandra Chatterjee and Bankim
Chandra
Chatterjee by the time he was in the final year in school. Among the
personalities of Indian history, the life of Shivaji fascinated him.
He read whatever he could get on him in Bengali. Dutt used to imagine
himself
as a member of Shivaji’s band of desperadoes.
After
finishing his matriculation in 1940, he had come to Patna. In those days World War was warming
up. There was a great opportunity for youth to make a career at the expense of
the Government. A well wisher of Dutt advised him to try and get recruited to
some special branch of the fighting forces. For the purpose he started to learn
type writing and line-telegraphy. After a short ups and downs finally he was blundered into the Royal Indian Navy
on February 28, 1941 as a Wireless Telegraphist.
Perception
After
being entered into the RIN Dutt’s perception towards navy was changed. From the
first day Indian ratings of RIN were welcomed with an unfamiliar language like
“Son
of a bitch”, “Bunch
of sickly monkeys, bloody cross between pigs and goats, bloody Sissies.” These
types of words of officer made it clear that signing the bond for
service
in the RIN was tantamount to signing away one’s soul. It was worse than
physical assault. Ratings had to face Such type of behavior
once again on the dining table. All the ratings were served with a huge
wooden
thali containing some 10 Kg. of very greasy and very hot daal and also a
large
pile of chappaties of massive size and thickness. Some of the fellowes,
however, went to get their plates and spoon from the kit bag. They
received another
torrent of choice abuse for their good manners.
Dutt’s
first meal in the RIN was a new experience. His batch had representatives from
practically all the communities and the major language groups in the country.
The cook lent them an aluminium mug from which all of them drank water. This
was his first communal meal which removed at one stroke the barriers from which
the society they came from.
Ever
since the sepoy mutiny of 1857 indian servicemen had been kept isolated from
the mainstream of the country’s life. Political reliability was an important
factor with the recruiting officials. Political literature, even of an
elementary nature, was kept out of reach of the ratings. Except the british
owned dailies and periodicals, no other material was allowed inside the
barracks or ships. The end of World War II changed the situation. There was a tremendous upsurge
in the country when the men of Subhash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army were
brought back to india
in 1945. The british commander-in-chief Auchinleck, wanted to try the INA men
for waging war against the King Emperor and for plotting the overthrow of his
Imperial Majesty’s Government of India.
It
was no longer possible to keep the ratings at the pre-war level of isolation.
They saw the world outside India
during war. Having travelled and also having learnt what the war was all
about,
most of them had become more sensitive to the condition of their own
country. Men in uniform were despised by people to whom those involved
in the Quit India
Movement were heroes.
What
turned B.C. Dutt from loyal servicemen into rebels? It was the result of a
chain of events spread over the long, dark days of the war.
Dutt
often found Indian servicemen working alongside white servicemen from the army.
In the Indian army, British servicemen received preferential treatment. Whether
at base or in a combat zone, they had better accommodation, better amenities.
They were paid five to ten times more for the same jobs that an Indian
servicemen did. They travelled more comfortably. They could, if they wished,
use Indian servicemen’s canteen, mess rooms but the Indians had no access to
theirs. The British servicemen were not required to salute viceroy’s
commissioned officers. The discrimination was crude, and was calculated to make
the Indians feel inferior to the British.
During
the World War, Dutt had seen the British people defending their country. He had
served alongside British sailors and others from the other commonwealth
countries in different theatres. They knew what they wre fighting for. Dutt
began to question his whole existence. What did he fight for? Whose war did he
fight? Was it for his country? To the British authorities Indian sailors were
servicemen but to nationalist India
these were mere mercenaries. He felt to prove that he was as much sons of the
soil as the nationalist india
who were fighting for the country’s independence. Without quite realizing it,
Dutt became a conspirator.
Conspirator
After
the World War, soldiers of royal Indian navy were ordered to get back India. They
returned to the shore-based signal school, H.M.I.S. TALWAR in Bombay. Every week new batches of ratings
poured in from different parts of the world to await demobilization or new
postings. Old friends who got scattered over the globe during the war met again
on the TALWAR at war’s end. One day a friend of B.C. Dutt, Salil Syam, returned from Malaya
with strange tales of the Indian National Army. Dutt had heard about them in Burma. Having
been with the occupation forces in Malaya, Syam
had come in direct contact with the men of INA. He had brought letters from
some members of the former Azad Hind Government addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru
and Sarat Chandra Bose. He also brought relevant literature and photographs. In
the RIN it would have been considered a high treason if Syam was found with the
letters.
Dutt
felt
he was holding a live bomb in his hands when Syam told him the contents
of
the packet he had smuggled into the TALWAR from across the sea. Syam
asked for
Dutt’s help in reaching the letters and literature to Sarat Bose and
Nehru. Dutt had suddenly become an important messenger of significant
tidings for his
country.
It
was not difficult to locate other ratings like Dutt on the TALWAR. Anyone who
had served more than a year in the RIN had his pet discontent and private
grudge against British. It was a question of selecting the right ones. But any
kind of anti-British work, agitational or otherwise, was extremely difficult
and risky because there were ratings of the security branch living with them in
the barracks. He gave himself a separate identity. For, he no longer considered
himself as mere ratings of the RIN . he considered himself as fighter for the
country’s freedom. He called himself “Azad
Hindi” and the group or organization of these men was called “Azad Hindustan”. But how did he
convince the ratings to join the Azad Hindustan?
The
canteen
of TALWAR became recruiting centre. Dutt extended liberal invitations
for tea and soft drinks to all. The main motive behind this party was to
make
friendly enquires about their experiences in different theatres of
war. The likely candidates for Azad Hindi were those who sounded bitter
about their
experiences. The strength of azad hindi did not exceed twenty regulars
and
about a dozen sympathizers during the four months of it’s existence.
A
comprehensive plan of operation was prepared. Dutt planned to channelize the
prevailing discontent over the sloppy demobilization policy through a
whispering campaign- towards sharpening the prevalent anti- British atmosphere;
to commit acts that would create disorder in the ships and barracks; to create
a sense of instability in the minds of the ratings through widespread sabotage.
It was not an easy job to preach from unit to unit or regiment to regiment the
lessons. He was feared about court-martialled and shot down the persons trying
to give the message of mother India.
The
revolution, Dutt wanted, was not of violence and blood-shed. With the help of
pamphlets he convinced the ratings not to consider an Englishman as a enemy. He
made ratings understood that an Englishman is also a citizen of the world as
like them. In England he was
a good man, but in India, he
could not tolerate their rise whereas they could not in India tolerate
his rule here. He appealed not to shed their blood unnecessarily to a
foreigner. It would be shed only for their motherland who stands the first for
it. Dutt knew it that it was not an easy job to obtain freedom from the strong
despots and monarchs. India was enslaved by sword and military and she
was to be set free by sword and forces. To awake the ratings of RIN he made
them aware towards their rights. In a pamphlet having titled “A thought for the day” he compared the
conditions of British and Indian ratings. The main motive bhind this act was to
awake them towards their rights and make them realized that they were a slave
that is why they were getting such type of treatment. He made them understood that india
could not be free unless they did not know about their rights. In
pamphlets he also narrated the glorious story of the INA and its Neta
Ji. He
explained about their motive, heroic deeds and defeat also. He told the
ratings
that glorious defeat is honourable than
the cowardice victory. Dutt appealed all the ratings to be considered themselves as “Azad Hindi” from the day and act such
as.
Act
of sabotage
Dutt
chose the Navy Day on December 1st 1945 as the curtain raiser for
the first act of sabotage because the civil population was invited for the
first time in the history of RIN to visit ships as well as the shore
establishments and the authorities wanted to present a Navy spick and span and
the ships dressed with flags and bunting.
Talwar
was not unguarded at night. Besides the permanent and regular sentries at the
main gate, there were half of dozen more sentries patrolling the grounds and
the barracks throughout the night. Fortunately half of sentries for middle
watch (12 to 4 am) were from Azad Hindi.The night became a witness to the organizing ability of the conspirators. The
TALWAR meant as an exhibit before an admiring Bombay public, was a shambles. The parade
ground was littered with burnt flags and bunting; brooms and buckets were
prominently displayed from the masthead. Political slogans in foot-high letters
were staring from every wall: ‘Quit
India’, ‘Down with the Imperialists’,
‘Revolt Now’, ‘Kill the British’’. Nothing
ever like it had happened before. For the ratings the slogans mirrored their
feelings.
The
operation was so well executed that no arrest could be made. The authorities
also preferred not to make too much fuss over the incident. After the Navy Day
success, scores of ratings became their adherents and chain of events had been started. R.K. Singh a member of Dutt’s group sent
up his resignation. At that time men in RIN could not resign. They were
dismissed, demobed or retired. Singh was charge-sheeted for sending in his
resignation. When he was brought before the commanding officer, Singh threw his
cap on the ground and kicked it, signifying his utter contempt for the crown
and the service. The news of Singh’s defiance reached the barracks in due
course. To many ratings he became a martyr.
Commander-in-chief’s
visit to the TALWAR was announced for February 2, 1946. This was his first
visit to TALWAR. Dutt and his group decided that this was an occasion for a better show than the
one they had put up for Navy Day. “Jai
Hind” and “Quit India” were
painted on the platform from which the C-in-C was to take the
salute. But Dutt had to be content with painting a few more slogans and
pasting a few
seditious leaflets on the barrack walls. He had got these leaflets
cyclostyled
and smuggled inside the TALWAR earlier. The message in the leaflet was a
call
to the conscience of the ratings.
The
sentries discovered the slogans on the platform about 5 a.m. The gum bottle was
the clue. Perhaps the whole watch consisting of four trainees had noticed him
walking out of the room with the gum bottle. The officer came looking for him.
When dutt’s locker was opened for inspection, mimeographed copies of “Indian Mutiny of 1857” by Ashok Mehta, his diaries, the copies of the leaflet he had distributed and some incriminating
letters were discovered.
The
Navy did not want to produce its own mini INA scandal. Meanwhile, the Bombay
Press had carried the news of Dutt’s arrest along with his photograph on the
front page. Exaggerated versions of his heroics before Commander King and the
admiral’s committee inspired many others on the Talwar to individual acts of
sabotage. Slogans began to appear on every wall. Some vehicles from the TALWAR
with anti-British slogans brazenly painted on both sides were inadvertently
driven through the city. These vehicles were used to fetch, each morning, milk
and rations from a depot. Even commander King’s car did not escape attention. These were the work of
ratings inspired by Dutt’s activities over the last few months which led to the mutiny on 18th february of 1946.
1946 INDIAN ARMY REVOLT AGAINST BRITAIN
Radioactive Rebels? - Outlook India
www.outlookindia.com/magazine/story/radioactive-rebels/240266
Published
• Jun 1, 20160
The Magazine
Radioactive Rebels?
Signalsmen of the Jabalpur mutiny of 1946 wonder why they aren't heroes
On the quiet morning of February
26, 1946, some 120 men of the 'J' company of the Signals Training
Centre (STC), Jabalpur, defied their British superiors and broke free
from their barracks. Part of a radio signalling unit, they were angry at
the abuse heaped on them by their British counterparts.
They were also upset at the incarceration of two Indian National Army (INA) officers at Red Fort in Delhi. The ranks of the mutineers swelled to 1,700 men, armed with nothing more than Congress and Muslim League flags. Shouting slogans, the patriotic mutineers protested peacefully for some days till a bayonet charge by the Somerset Light Infantry brought the mutiny to a halt.
Eighty men behind the mutiny were court-martialled and dismissed without pay and pension. Forty-one others were sent to prison. But the incident was quickly hushed up. The British officers stationed in Jabalpur were replaced by Indian officers and most of the records destroyed. And so, a chapter in India's struggle for freedom was virtually buried. The recognition due to the soldiers for standing up to British might was denied them.
In sharp contrast, the naval ratings who mutinied just days ahead of the Jabalpur mutiny were recognised as freedom fighters. The mutiny was officially recognised as part of the freedom struggle by the government of India. The men were allowed to serve in the navy of independent India and retire with full pensionary benefits, pay and allowances. What's more, they were awarded special freedom fighter's pensions. All that the mutineers of Jabalpur received for their efforts was a bayonet charge, rigorous imprisonment and dismissal without benefits.
The Jabalpur mutiny, though lost to public historians, left a deep impact on the British. The then commander-in-chief of the British Indian army, Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck, sent several secret cables back to London, discussing a quick transfer of power from British hands to the Indians. Seeing the Jabalpur and the navy mutiny of Bombay together, the British were worrying about the probability of a larger insurrection. Therefore, when the men of the 'J' company stood in defiance, they made history—this was the first and only major instance of Indian army regulars challenging the British.
The effect was telling. The naval mutiny—and another in the air force, a few days earlier—could be contained. But the shock was from the Jabalpur mutiny, for the British Indian army and its loyalty was considered the backbone of British rule in India.
Maj Gen V.K. Singh and his book The account of the Jabalpur mutiny has now been recorded in The Contribution of the Indian Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement, a recent book by Maj Gen V.K. Singh (retd), chairman of the signals corps's history cell.
Singh chanced upon the few remaining records of the Jabalpur mutiny while working on the official history of the Corps of Signals. He has already published the second volume of the corps's history and is busy collating material for the third and final volume. "I saw what Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote to the army commanders, worried that the loyalty of the Indian troops couldn't be taken for granted anymore. This had a profound impact on the British and probably quickened the departure of the British from India," Singh told Outlook.
It was in 2002, when Singh reopened dusty files of the Corps of Signals, that he lighted upon this forgotten chapter of the mutiny. "It seems that the men were agitated at the result of the INA trials, in which two officers were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The fact that Indian troops were treated as inferior to the British and paid less also added to their anger," says Singh.
He immediately took up the cause of getting the mutiny recognised as a part of the freedom struggle. However, he only ran into the impenetrable Indian bureaucracy. As letters flew between Singh, the directorate of signals, ministry of defence, and the ministry of home affairs (MHA), the bureaucratic machinery continued to hold out. Singh took pains to point out to any official who would care to hear him out that the Jabalpur men had been ignored while recognition had been accorded to the naval ratings who participated in the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, which ironically took place a couple of weeks before the Jabalpur mutiny.
A list of the court-martialled
Click here for large image
Meanwhile, one of the survivors of the mutiny, Lance Naik Neelakantan Nair, went to the Kerala High Court seeking directions to the MHA. In July 2003, the court directed the MHA and the state government to look into the matter and report back in six months. But nothing came of it. Finally, in a letter dated February 14, 2003 (No 8/2/2003-FF-P), the MHA stated that the issue of granting freedom fighter status to the mutineers had been "considered and it has been decided at the level of the home minister that they cannot be treated as freedom fighters."
The then home minister and currently the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, L.K. Advani, as the letter states, did not find the mutiny and its impact adequate enough to club it with the freedom struggle. After much persuasion from the signals corps, some of the participants, 41 out of over 1,700 mutineers, were granted a meagre pension while the others were dismissed since official records showed that they had been "discharged on administrative grounds". What the MHA forgot to look into was a small but critical detail on the discharge certificates. The men had been discharged, the certificate stated, for taking part in the "Jubalpore STC mutiny".
"It is absurd. All the naval mutineers have been recognised and feted by the government as freedom fighters. They too were discharged on administrative grounds. But the same logic didn't hold true for the men who suffered for decades for participating in the mutiny," says Singh. Ironically, the naval mutineers were also radiomen just like the ones in Jabalpur.
M.A. Kochuvareed, a mutineer
Eighty-seven-year-old M.A. Kochuvareed, who was a havildar during the Jabalpur mutiny and is one of its few survivors, has laboured to seek recognition from the government for nearly 60 years. His memory is fading, but Kochuvareed still remembers those fateful days of the uprising in great detail. "Just two weeks before the mutiny, we had heard Pandit Nehru at a rally in Jabalpur. He told us that even a chotta harkat (minor move) on our part would be enough to bring down the British flag and raise the Indian tricolour. Many were already agitated and we decided to take on the British soon after that. A few days after the mutiny began the British sent in a bayonet charge that killed nearly eight people and injured 30 others," Kochuvareed recounted to Outlook.
Indian officers such as Brig Terence Baretto and Maj Gen K.K. Tiwari, both then war-weary captains in the British Indian army, were rushed to Jabalpur by army headquarters and the command of the unit was handed over to another Indian officer, one Lt Col Mukherjee. "As an adjutant I was in charge of the quarterguard where the men had been incarcerated and we heard from them about how they had been ill-treated by their British counterparts. I learnt a lot from them," remembers Tiwari.
So why did the British hush up the Jabalpur mutiny? They feared trouble if the news of the revolt spread to other army units across British India. A year later, as independent India finally became a reality, the brave men of Jabalpur became a footnote in the forgotten records of the Corps of Signals.
They were also upset at the incarceration of two Indian National Army (INA) officers at Red Fort in Delhi. The ranks of the mutineers swelled to 1,700 men, armed with nothing more than Congress and Muslim League flags. Shouting slogans, the patriotic mutineers protested peacefully for some days till a bayonet charge by the Somerset Light Infantry brought the mutiny to a halt.
Eighty men behind the mutiny were court-martialled and dismissed without pay and pension. Forty-one others were sent to prison. But the incident was quickly hushed up. The British officers stationed in Jabalpur were replaced by Indian officers and most of the records destroyed. And so, a chapter in India's struggle for freedom was virtually buried. The recognition due to the soldiers for standing up to British might was denied them.
In sharp contrast, the naval ratings who mutinied just days ahead of the Jabalpur mutiny were recognised as freedom fighters. The mutiny was officially recognised as part of the freedom struggle by the government of India. The men were allowed to serve in the navy of independent India and retire with full pensionary benefits, pay and allowances. What's more, they were awarded special freedom fighter's pensions. All that the mutineers of Jabalpur received for their efforts was a bayonet charge, rigorous imprisonment and dismissal without benefits.
The Jabalpur mutiny, though lost to public historians, left a deep impact on the British. The then commander-in-chief of the British Indian army, Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck, sent several secret cables back to London, discussing a quick transfer of power from British hands to the Indians. Seeing the Jabalpur and the navy mutiny of Bombay together, the British were worrying about the probability of a larger insurrection. Therefore, when the men of the 'J' company stood in defiance, they made history—this was the first and only major instance of Indian army regulars challenging the British.
The effect was telling. The naval mutiny—and another in the air force, a few days earlier—could be contained. But the shock was from the Jabalpur mutiny, for the British Indian army and its loyalty was considered the backbone of British rule in India.
Maj Gen V.K. Singh and his book The account of the Jabalpur mutiny has now been recorded in The Contribution of the Indian Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement, a recent book by Maj Gen V.K. Singh (retd), chairman of the signals corps's history cell.
Singh chanced upon the few remaining records of the Jabalpur mutiny while working on the official history of the Corps of Signals. He has already published the second volume of the corps's history and is busy collating material for the third and final volume. "I saw what Gen Sir Claude Auchinleck wrote to the army commanders, worried that the loyalty of the Indian troops couldn't be taken for granted anymore. This had a profound impact on the British and probably quickened the departure of the British from India," Singh told Outlook.
It was in 2002, when Singh reopened dusty files of the Corps of Signals, that he lighted upon this forgotten chapter of the mutiny. "It seems that the men were agitated at the result of the INA trials, in which two officers were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. The fact that Indian troops were treated as inferior to the British and paid less also added to their anger," says Singh.
He immediately took up the cause of getting the mutiny recognised as a part of the freedom struggle. However, he only ran into the impenetrable Indian bureaucracy. As letters flew between Singh, the directorate of signals, ministry of defence, and the ministry of home affairs (MHA), the bureaucratic machinery continued to hold out. Singh took pains to point out to any official who would care to hear him out that the Jabalpur men had been ignored while recognition had been accorded to the naval ratings who participated in the Royal Indian Navy mutiny, which ironically took place a couple of weeks before the Jabalpur mutiny.
A list of the court-martialled
Click here for large image
Meanwhile, one of the survivors of the mutiny, Lance Naik Neelakantan Nair, went to the Kerala High Court seeking directions to the MHA. In July 2003, the court directed the MHA and the state government to look into the matter and report back in six months. But nothing came of it. Finally, in a letter dated February 14, 2003 (No 8/2/2003-FF-P), the MHA stated that the issue of granting freedom fighter status to the mutineers had been "considered and it has been decided at the level of the home minister that they cannot be treated as freedom fighters."
The then home minister and currently the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, L.K. Advani, as the letter states, did not find the mutiny and its impact adequate enough to club it with the freedom struggle. After much persuasion from the signals corps, some of the participants, 41 out of over 1,700 mutineers, were granted a meagre pension while the others were dismissed since official records showed that they had been "discharged on administrative grounds". What the MHA forgot to look into was a small but critical detail on the discharge certificates. The men had been discharged, the certificate stated, for taking part in the "Jubalpore STC mutiny".
"It is absurd. All the naval mutineers have been recognised and feted by the government as freedom fighters. They too were discharged on administrative grounds. But the same logic didn't hold true for the men who suffered for decades for participating in the mutiny," says Singh. Ironically, the naval mutineers were also radiomen just like the ones in Jabalpur.
M.A. Kochuvareed, a mutineer
Eighty-seven-year-old M.A. Kochuvareed, who was a havildar during the Jabalpur mutiny and is one of its few survivors, has laboured to seek recognition from the government for nearly 60 years. His memory is fading, but Kochuvareed still remembers those fateful days of the uprising in great detail. "Just two weeks before the mutiny, we had heard Pandit Nehru at a rally in Jabalpur. He told us that even a chotta harkat (minor move) on our part would be enough to bring down the British flag and raise the Indian tricolour. Many were already agitated and we decided to take on the British soon after that. A few days after the mutiny began the British sent in a bayonet charge that killed nearly eight people and injured 30 others," Kochuvareed recounted to Outlook.
Indian officers such as Brig Terence Baretto and Maj Gen K.K. Tiwari, both then war-weary captains in the British Indian army, were rushed to Jabalpur by army headquarters and the command of the unit was handed over to another Indian officer, one Lt Col Mukherjee. "As an adjutant I was in charge of the quarterguard where the men had been incarcerated and we heard from them about how they had been ill-treated by their British counterparts. I learnt a lot from them," remembers Tiwari.
So why did the British hush up the Jabalpur mutiny? They feared trouble if the news of the revolt spread to other army units across British India. A year later, as independent India finally became a reality, the brave men of Jabalpur became a footnote in the forgotten records of the Corps of Signals.
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AUTHORS: Saikat Datta
PLACES: Madhya Pradesh
TAGS: Defence, Flag - Tricolour etc
SECTION: National
OUTLOOK: 20 April, 2009
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