A SIMILAR STORY IS THE MASS EXECUTION OF INA SOLDIERS UNDER SUBHASH CHANDRA BOSE -WHO WERE IN EUROPE UNDR GERMAN=NAZI COMMAND .
AT THE TIME OF D DAY AMERICAN INVASION OF EUROPE THEY WERE GAURDING THE SEA TO THE NORTH OF THE PLACE WHERE AMERICANS LANDED TROOPS
GERMANS THOUGHT INDIAN -INA SOLDIERS SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE INTERIOR
1944=BEFORE SECOND WORLD WAR WAS OVER -INA SOLDIERS WERE STATIONED ON SWISS BORDER
LATER THEY WERE MASS KILLED BY SOME SOLDIERS ON HIRE
176 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
two Red Cross parcels a week and they offered R
food.11
The camp at Annaburg had, by then, been turned over to Indian prisoners
in its entirety. The Germans not only found difficulties in administering to the
Indians' needs, but also discovered that the Indian NCOs were extremely loyal,
and continued to hold the rank and file under an iron grip. Bose, still using the
name Mazzotta, instructed the twenty sent from Sicily to try and win the
prisoners over. They found themselves up against the NCOs from the beginning,
and made little headway. Then, with the German decision, in December 1 94 1 , to
start to recruit an Indian battalion, Bose was able to shed his secrecy within his
Indian circle and become more directly involved. His first step was to visit the
Schliefenufer Camp in Berlin and talk directly with those he knew were loyal to
his cause. This he did on 1 1 December.
When Bose stood up to talk, he had before him an audience of only twenty-
four - eleven from the 3rd Motor Brigade and a further thirteen from 22 Animal
Transport Company. He told them of his plans for a free India and, more impor-
tantly, his plans to raise an army to fight for that liberation. Bose, it transpired,
had no trouble in persuading those before him that he was right. Singh Mangat
recalled that 'tears flowed from all eyes inclusive of Netaji's and it was all quiet
there for some minutes'. For Bose himself, this must have been one of his crown-
ing moments. After all the difficulties he had encountered in trying to persuade
the Germans to help him, here, now, was the nucleus of his Army of Liberation.
This, coupled with the fact that his Free India Centre had opened the day before,
must have looked like a real beginning.12
With the German High Command now behind him, Bose and his small
band had somehow to win over the rest of the Indians at Annaburg. The day after
his Schliefenufer visit, Bose despatched three of his most loyal followers to the
camp. Their task was to prepare the way for Bose himself to address the prisoners.
This was to be no easy job. The Indians at Annaburg were making life very
difficult for their German captors. Indeed, one morning there had been a near
riot, and the camp guards had been given orders to fire over the heads of the
prisoners. In the general confusion, however, one prisoner was shot in the leg.
Bose arrived at Annaburg on the afternoon of 21 December. The meeting
was held in a large theatre block within the camp confines. Hardly had Bose
entered the hall than the prisoners, led by their NCOs, started stamping on the
wooden floor and coughing loudly. Bose was drowned out completely and it was
some time before order was restored. He spoke to them for two hours, a daunting
thought, outlining his plans as he had done in Berlin. The next morning, he again
visited the prisoners, this time talking to individuals in their huts. By all accounts,
he found that the rank and file, separated from their NCOs, were more ready to
listen. Singh Mangat claims that over 1000 men volunteered there and then, but
" See Public Record Office [PRO], W0208/808.
12 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 64-5.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 177
this is highly unlikely. Either way, on leaving the camp on 22 December
left empty-handed, giving the prisoners time to think about what he had
Privately, Bose was convinced that the army could be raised. On 26 January
he held a meeting at his private residence, 6 Sophienstrasse, in Berlin. W
everybody had arrived, Bose motioned eight of them to a line of chairs. On sit
down, they were informed that they had been chosen as the first recruits
'Azad Hind Fauj', or Free India Army. (There were, in fact, fifteen recruits
but the other seven were putting into operation the next steps of formin
Legion.) Singh Mangat recalls that 'each of the eight signed the pledge in h
blood and the document was all blood-bathed'.14
As has been mentioned, while Bose was declaring his military hand in Berlin,
the remainder of those few who had joined him were busy in the camps. Bose did
not forget the near riot at Annaburg, orchestrated by the NCOs. He duly had the
NCOs separated from their men, hopefully making the latter more malleable to
his persuasion. These men were then sent, in groups, to a camp at Frankenburg
where they were met by some of the first fifteen recruited by Bose. Resplendent
in their new uniforms, mostly standard German grey battledress, they set about
trying to persuade the prisoners as to the plausibility and sincerity of their cause.
As a cover to the outside world, the camp was given the rather ambiguous title of
Arbeitskommando Frankenburg.15
While the first recruiters were at work in Frankenburg, Bose also sent a four-
man team to Messeri tz, home of the Lehrregiment Brandenburg, Germany's
special forces unit. Here again, batches of prisoners arrived from Annaburg to be
inducted into the Legion. The choice of Messeritz as a recruitment camp is not
so odd when one recalls Bose's plan to broadcast clandestinely from northern
India. At MeąSęritz, a special forces company was slowly built up under the
command of one Hauptmann Harbig.16
Those Indians that joined found themselves training alongside many other
nationals, including Tajiks, Uzbeks and Persians, the first two groups helping to
form an 'Arab' Legion along the same lines as the Indians.17 The Indians received
both basic infantry and more specialised training in such areas as demolition and
wireless operation. Bose had planned that these, his commandos, would be used
in North Africa, as a propaganda unit to induce desertion amongst the many
Indian Army units serving there. This plan was scotched by Rommel himself,
however, who 'never had considered the battlefield to be the place for proving
Foreign Office ideas'.18 With the waning of the German hand in the Middle East
after El Alamein, the idea was quickly forgotten. The Indians at Messeritz had
proved themselves to be very capable, doing well in various exercises during the
13 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, p. 75.
14 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 88-9.
15 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 91-2. For details of the uniform see p. 94.
16 See Hugh Toye, The Springing Tiger (London, 1959), p. 69.
17 Toye, Springing Tiger , p. 70.
18 Ibid.
1 78 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
autumn of 1942. However, with nowhere to go, they
mainstream Legion in January 1943.
Back at Frankenburg, recruiting was still going somewhat slowly. The
prisoners were brought up in batches of seventy-five and housed in huts alongside
those already committed to the Legion. It is probable that every sort of induce-
ment was used, from physical violence to extra rations, money and women. At
the same time, there were probably those who did believe in the cause of a free
India and it was doubtless through these individuals that the recruitment slowly
began to gather steam. Bose himself took great interest in his Legion, often
visiting both Frankenburg and Mes^eritz. At the same time, he was also heavily
committed to the propaganda war and in April 1942 made his first broadcast on
his Azad Hind Radio, direct to India. This he did as Chandra Bose, dropping the
name Mazzotta and declaring his hand to the world.
By sheer chance there was an Englishman at Frankenburg; Frank Chetwin
Becker. He had been brought up in Germany since 1924, having lost his German
father and English mother. In 1939 his English passport had run out while in
Germany and he was obliged to see the German authorities. They classed him as
Volksdeutche and insisted he enter the German Army - or go to a concentration
camp! Becker was posted to an interpreter unit, near Dresden, in April 1940. His
job was to teach POW camp guard personnel English. In about August 1942, he
was again moved, this time to the Arbeitskommando Frankenburg. At his sub-
sequent interrogation by MI5 in 1 945, he had this to say:
When I first went to the Frankenburg camp (Stalag 4A) there were
about 6000 Indian prisoners there. In about August or September 1942
about 300 of these men were taken to a camp at KOENIGSBREUCK,
where they were formed into a labour battalion ... In fact, however,
they received military training, and in about November 1943 were
called (IND) I.R.950 in place of Arbeitskommando Frankenburg.19
By the middle of 1942, the Legion recruiters were running out of prisoners to
approach. It is not recorded how many had joined at this period, but it was
probably in the region of 300 to 400. The Legion had two main problems, lack of
recruitable manpower and lack of space for the unit itself. The latter difficulty was
easily solved, the Legion being transferred from Frankenburg to Königsbrück.
Here there were two barrack complexes, the Alteslager and the Neueslager. The
move was made in midsummer, 1942, probably around 15 July. The majority of
the Legion was housed in the Neueslager, with the Officers' Mess, MT and HQ
Companies going to the Alteslager.20 Becker, the English interpreter, was with 5
Company. His MI5 report had this to say:
In the beginning there were only 30/40 men in his company (No. 5).
Batches of 30 Indian PW were brought from [the] Altes Lager to [the]
"This MI5 report was found, quite by chance, in the Home Office Files in the PRO. See
H045/25829.
20 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, p. 113.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 179
Neues Lager and attached to different companies. The old members
used to look after the new arrivals and take them round to their trg
ground and make them feel at home while they were in barracks.21
With regard to the manpower problems, fate lent a helping hand. A m
before the move to Königsbrück, Rommel's forces managed to take the A
port of Tobruk. A large number of Allied prisoners fell into German han
including many Indians. Most of these prisoners were to end up in Italian
and Bose, seeing a valuable source of manpower in the offing, sent a delegat
Italy to try and organise the transfer of the new Indian POWs to German
Italians agreed to releasing a first batch of 500, with larger groups promised in
future. These prisoners were moved directly to Königsbrück where they f
the Legion well housed, well fed and well paid in comparison with the de
tions they had had to suffer, both in the desert and in the Italian camps.
Becker's report also mentioned the arrival of the Indians from Italy:
In the middle of December 1942 after having a quarrel with his Coy
Comdr, O/Lt STEPHEN, over office work, he was sent to the Altes
Lager as a welfare Officer to look after 1000 PW, who had arrived from
Italy and were put in quarantine due to a case of smallpox. This quaran-
tine lasted until the middle of Jan. 1943. There were only 10 Germans
who worked as camp staff in this Lager.
The report went on to state:
Soon after the quarantine was lifted he went back to [the] Neues Lager
and was posted as a clerk to the newly formed 12 Coy under Lt
FIRGAU. The total strength of this Coy was about 70.22
Bose, by this time, was becoming adept in his psychological recruitment. He
visited the Legion quite often in the summer and autumn of 1942, having his
men paraded on the grass lawns to listen to his long speeches. These methods
usually worked, but not always. The recruiters could also use more devious
methods, as Major Mackay also reported:
Many groups of Indians have told Major Mackay that they were taken
to Königsbrück, put through the delouser, thrown some under-clothing,
put in a bare room five or six together, German uniform was thrown
into them and then they were left there until they came out on parade
dressed in German uniforms.
The last paragraph in the Mackay report went on to say:
German troops on active service and also local people are very worried
about Indians being at Königsbrück as they have considerable liberty
21 PRO, H045/25829.
22 Ibid.
1 80 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
and too much connection with local German women for whom the Red
Cross chocolate is a great bribe.23
By October 1942, the First Battalion was fully formed and involved in train-
ing exercises. The Second Battalion was complete by January the following year
and a third battalion had started to form a month after the second.
Bose had always dreamed that his Legion would be used in a direct fight
against the British in India. By the beginning of 1943, this was obviously not
possible. The Germans were facing defeats on a number of fronts, especially in
Russia and North Africa, the two routes leading to India. The notion of sending
the Legion to Africa had been quashed by Rommel, and an idea to base part of it
in Greece was also rejected.24 By this stage, also, the Germans were asking for the
allegiance of the Legion to Germany. Bose was forced to accept that his men
would have to be absorbed into the German command structure. Consequently,
several parades were held at Königsbrück where the Indians were sworn in, as all
German soldiers were. At one of these parades, probably in early September
1942, Bose took the salute and presented colours to the First Battalion. The
Indians, according to Singh Mangat 'were turned out in a hollow square' and,
he went on to say, 'A large number of German and Japanese cameramen were
standing in readiness'. Bose took the salute and then addressed the men before
him, ending with a somewhat hollow promise, 'I shall lead the army to India
when we march together'. Six men, along with a German officer, sword drawn,
then moved to the centre of the parade ground and swore their allegiance to
Hitler as the Commander of the German Army, and Bose as the leader of the
Legion. There had been great problems over this oath as the Germans had, at
first, wanted the Indians to swear to Hitler as their leader, which, fundamentally,
he was not. With the ceremony over, after a march-past by companies, Bose took
lunch with the men of 2 Company.25
It is interesting to note that there was a Japanese presence at the Königs-
brück parade. Apart from the Japanese press, Bose was accompanied by Colonel
Yamamoto Bin, the Military Attaché from the embassy in Berlin. The Japanese
had become very interested in Bose and his activities. Japanese victories in the
Far East were bringing them ever closer to the Indian border and they already
had large numbers of Indian prisoners. The previous year, the Japanese Ambas-
sador had been ordered to report on Bose to the Imperial High Command.26
Bose thus became a frequent visitor to the Japanese embassy in Berlin. Now, with
the opportunities of launching his Legion into India from the west greatly dimin-
ished, Bose was becoming more and more enamoured with the idea of striking
from Japanese-held territory in the east. He had proved that Indian prisoners
could be recruited and formed into a coherent unit and consequently, on 8
February 1943, Bose left Berlin for the last time. He made his way to Kiel where
23 PRO, W0208/808.
24 Bose, The Lost Hero , p. 200.
25 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 123-4.
26 Bose, The Lost Hero , p. 189.
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INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 181
he boarded a German U-boat, U-180, and sailed for the Far East. Bose left
Free India Centre and the Legion in the hands of his right-hand man, Nam
left-wing Indian journalist who had lived in Europe for the last eighteen years.
With Bose gone, the Indian Legion was very much, in the hands of
German High Command. No longer could they be protected by Bose, alth
he had extracted a promise from the Germans that they would only be u
against British troops and not transferred to the Russian front. Consequendy,
Germans were at a loss as to what to do with the Legion. With the format
the Third Battalion well under way, the Legion numbered just over 3000 all
by the time Bose left Germany.28 With such indecision, boredom soon set
Königsbrück, although recruiting was still going ahead. MI5 in their Becker rep
said:
In Jan. 1943 he went with Hauptmann BLODIC to the Brenner Pass
and take [stc] over a party of 1000 Indian PW from Italy and take them
to Annaburg . . . On return from Annaburg he resumed his duties with
12 Coy and worked there until March 43. During this period . . . S. C.
Bose and GANPULEY visited them from time to time. S. C. BOSE left
for the Far East in Feb. 43 and never came again to the Legion. After
the mutiny in 3 Coy in March 43, GANPULEY came and visited them
at Koenigsbrueck.29
At this point, it is worth looking at the composition of the Legion. Broadly, it
consisted of three battalions of about 1000 men each. Each battalion consisted of
three rifle companies, a heavy weapons company and a support company. The
heavy weapons company was comprised of two MG platoons and three sections
of two 81mm mortars, while the support company consisted of a battery of six
75mm howitzers, a battery of six anti-tank guns and a pioneer platoon. Integral
to the Legion as a whole were signals and MT platoons. In all cases, the
weaponry was German, although probably of an older vintage.30
Anticipating the earlier proposals that the Legion should be used in North
Africa or Greece, the Indians were issued with the German tropical uniform,
similar to that worn by the Afrika Korps. The one exception was that Sikhs were
permitted to wear turbans as opposed to field caps or steel helmets. This type of
uniform must have been fairly useless in combating the cold of a German winter,
adding yet another problem with which the German officers and senior NCOs
had to deal.
Trouble soon flared at Königsbrück, with rumours rife amongst the soldiers.
27 A full account of Bose's journey to Japan can be found in Corr, War of the Springing Tigers, pp.
144-6. See also Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 130-1.
28 The Legion's strength cannot be accurately judged due to the lack of contemporary documen-
tation. Hugh Toye says it was only just over 2000 while Singh Mangat claims it was over 3000. See
also Gen. Mohan Singh, Soldiers' Contributions to Indian Independence (Army Educational Stores,
New Delhi, 1978), p. 227.
29 PRO, H045/25829.
30 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, diagr. p. 7.
1 82 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Bose's absence had been noticed but no one had told
Word got round that the Legion was to be used on
soon quashed by the Legion's German colonel, Obers
fellow officers. When, however, the true destinatio
Battalions was known, namely Holland, via the Beve
gium, 3 Company of the First Battalion refused t
quickly, court-martialling forty-seven Indians and ac
great was the number of Indians undergoing militar
unit had to be left behind to administer them.31
The first Indian troops entrained for Belgium on
behind the Third Battalion to complete its basic tra
going to use the Indians for coastal defence, primaril
in Belgium was for one final field exercise and lasted
go unnoticed, however. MI2 informed the Director of
War Office that:
CX Report shows . . . Indians arrived BEVERLOO CAMP. Same
report shows Green-White-Orange flash is in form of shield with tiger
superimposed.32
At the end of April, the First and Second Battalions of Infantry Regiment
950, as the Legion was now called, moved to Holland. The First Battalion (1/950
IR) was stationed on the coast at Zandvoort while the Second (11/950 IR) was
sent to the Friesian island of Texel. A month later, in May, the Third Battalion
(III/950 IR) left Königsbrück and took post at Oldebruck, where it continued its
field training. The Becker report stated:
He [Becker] was transferred in March 43 to 3 Bn Staff as an interpreter
and a clerk. In Jul. 43 he left with 3 Bn Staff for Holland. They went to
Oldebrouck. He says there were no propaganda or visits by any Indian
civilians . . . except once when GANPULEY visited 3 Bn HQ and
inspected it. 3 Bn was engaged in A/Tk, Rifle and Infantry trg during
this period.33
Life cannot have been much fun for the Indians, posted as they were on the
coast of the North Sea. They were not being used to liberate India, and the preju-
dices of the local Nazis were also surfacing - the mayor of Zandvoort going so far
as to put up posters around the town, warning the female population in general
not to consort with non-Germanic troops!34
In August 1943, the Indians were probably very glad to be told that they
31 Philip Buss, notes to the author, and PRO, H045/25829.
32 PRO, W0208/808. Singh Mangat blamed the troubles on agitators within the Legion, The
Tiger Strikes, pp. 134-5.
33 PRO, H045/25829. The Becker report would suggest that HQ 3 Bn staff were the last to leave
for Holland, not surprising as the Legion still had a number of rear parties at Königsbrück.
34 Gen. J. J. de Wolf to Philip Buss.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 1 83
were being moved to the French Atlantic coast, between Bordeaux and the
Spanish border, under command of the German 344th Infantry Division.35 Here,
as in Holland, the battalions were widely separated. Regimental Headquarters
and 1/950 were stationed at Lacanau, 11/950 at Nantes while III/950 went to
Biarritz. So great were the distances between battalions that regimental command
was found to be too difficult. Within weeks, the battalions were moved closer to
Regimental Headquarters. Consequently, 1/950 moved to Houtrin and III/950 to
the area around Lege. 11/950 was withdrawn from coastal duties and moved
inland to a reserve position at Souge. From then on, the coastal battalions always
operated with two companies forward, the remainder of the battalion acting as
reserve further inland.
It would appear that the Indians settled down to their coastal defence duties
quite well, although there were instances of ill-discipline, primarily due to the
German lack of awareness with regard to Indian customs, and because the
Germans still insisted that only German officers would lead the regiment. Unfor-
tunately, it was again 3 Company of 1/950 that caused all the trouble. Soon after,
however, on 1 October 1943, the German authorities relented and the Indians
elected their first twelve commissioned officers from within their own ranks.36
By the beginning of 1944, the tide was definitely turning against the Axis
powers. North Africa had been won by the Allies, as had the first stepping-stone
into Europe, Sicily. From here the Allies had invaded Italy, now totally under
German control after the surrender of the Italians in September 1943. The
second front could not be far away, and the Germans knew it. Despite the now
desperate odds, the Germans and their remaining allies fought a dogged battle,
none more so than in Italy. The Germans soon realised that they were facing the
British 8th Army and, consequently, Indian units. Two parties from the Legion
were despatched to Italy for propaganda work. The first departed in January 1944
and was attached to Kesselring's Headquarters. Their task was threefold: to man
wireless stations broadcasting to the Allies, organise leaflet raids and interrogate
Indian POWs. This party was to remain in Italy until March 1945. The second
party despatched to Italy consisted of a complete company, 9 Company. Singh
Mangat says that they were found to be very useful by the Germans as the British
would move their own Indian troops to another part of the front. This sounds
a trifle implausible. The only real value the Indians could have been was as a
propaganda stunt. Indeed, 9 Company had been reported as useless by their
company commander, having been in the front lines opposite the Polish division.
The company only lost one man throughout the tour and subsequently returned
to the Legion in January 1945. 37
An insight into the Legion at this time can be gleaned from an Indian Army
Intelligence report, quoting a letter from a German soldier:
35 See Georg Tessili, Verbände und Truppen der Deutchen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Zweiten
Weltkreig 1939-1945 (Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück, 1976), xiii, 153.
36 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 154-5.
37 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 165-7.
1 84 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
So here are we 4 alone . . . with the company we a
Indian Company, all Indians . . . All romantic fell
thick beards and plaits. They all wear khaki unifor
shorts, light shoes and the Africa cap. First class e
got. Above all marvellous food . . . they live like
Against this the real value of the troops is nothi
with kid gloves. If a hard word is said to them they r
they are volunteers and only German soldiers for
. . . The German personnel are all men picked for the
During the early summer of 1944, prior to the Nor
Regiment 950 underwent another organisational change, in line with most
German units. Each battalion lost its heavy weapons company in direct support,
this being broken up and distributed to one of three new companies formed
under regimental control. These were 13 Company with the howitzers and
mortars, 14 Company with the anti-tank guns and panzerfaustņ and 15 Company,
the pioneer company. At the same time these changes were implemented, the
Legion set up its own recruiting and training organisation, under III/950
command, to try and boost its manpower. Many of the POWs targeted had
arrived from Italy in the early winter of 1943 and were now housed at Limburg.
Many were transferred to a camp at Epinal, in France, making them very accessible
to the Legion.
The camp at Epinal soon earned itself a name amongst Indian prisoners.
The recruitment methods appear not to have been as pleasant as those at
Frankenburg or Königsbrück. A short report from Switzerland to MI9, dated 25
July 1944, ran as follows:
20616 Sepoy Fahorn Silangan, 2 A/Tk Bty, 2nd Indian Field Regiment
states:
(a) He was court-martialled on April 1 5th 1 944 at Epinal on a charge
striking a soldier while in Stalag 4D September 2nd 1943 and sentenc
to be shot.
(b) The case against him trumped up by . . . two . . . Indians from his
own village who had joined the German Indian Legion and who gave
false evidence against him.
(c) He was offered release several times if he would join the German
Indian Legion.39
While German and other Axis units fought hard to counter the Normandy
landings, those in central and southern France found themselves facing increased
'Maquis' activity, especially attacks against the road and rail systems. Conse-
quently, 11/950 was warned off for anti-partisan duties and moved sixty kilo-
metres inland, its old coastal positions being taken up by III/950, then still in
38 PRO, WO208/818.
39 PRO, W0208/808.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 185
reserve at Souge. (By this date, the Legion was under command of the G
159th Reserve Infantry Division.40) 11/950 found itself at Saumos, moving
on 23 July. After a short rest, the battalion was again moved, this time to
Jaloux, close to the Mont de Marsan, a Resistance enclave. The battalion ar
during the night of 26/27 July and was soon warned off for an operation
a suspected Maquis camp nearby. The attack was to be on 2 August. Lucki
perhaps, for the Indians, the French were aware of the impending assaul
Indian point sections did find the camp, where they came across evidenc
hurried withdrawal.41
The Legion's anti-partisan activities came to an abrupt halt when the A
landed in southern France. The Germans, fearing the obvious pincer move
ordered a complete evacuation from central and southern France. The Ind
Legion was duly warned and the First and Third Battalions left their coa
positions on 1 5 August. It would appear that only part of the regiment moved
rail, bound for Libourne. Those that moved by foot were directed to Ango
Two days later, the Second Battalion was also ordered to withdraw, movi
Bazas, with its 6 Company moving from a position near Captieux. On nea
their initial destinations, orders were received to the effect that the complete
ment was to withdraw towards the German border at Alsace. For the Indians,
and their remaining German officers, the withdrawal must have been plagued
with problems. Motorised transport was at a premium, with only the battalion
support companies being lorry-borne. 11/950 was lucky to have bicycles while the
other two battalions had to move on foot.
On reaching their initial positions, the whole of the Legion was directed on
to Poitiers, with a halt en route at Ruffec. It was here that the Indians were to
experience their first true action against the Maquis in what was to turn into a
running battle through central France.
The Indians, along with other German units, arrived on 18 August. Local
intelligence told them that the Maquis were planning an attack against the town
and, consequently, the Indians started to dig in. Within a short space of time, a
loudspeaker van approached 5 Company positions and started broadcasting in
Hindustani, urging the Indians to surrender. This van was later ambushed. Soon
after, the main attack materialised and the guns of 13 Company came into action,
forcing the Maquis to withdraw. For this action, two Indians were decorated.
Gian Singh, a platoon commander and Banta Singh who had commanded the
artillery. Both men were awarded the Vir-e-Hind and Tamgha-e-Bahaduri in
silver with swords, by the Free India Centre in Berlin, while the Germans
awarded them both the Iron Cross, Second Class.42
Throughout the remaining days of August and well into September, the
Indians made their way towards the German border. Virtually every day, at least
one of the companies would be in contact with the enemy. Soon the strain began
40Tessin, Verbände und Truppen , xiii, 153.
41 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 174-6.
42 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 165-7.
1 86 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
to show amongst the Indians and their officers, bo
to lose control. Reports of rape and general pillage
Allies from the Resistance.
There had been an incident at Angoulême station, where the Maquis
attempted to attack the train from a hijacked car. In the ensuing fire-fight, the
Indians not only killed their attackers, but also the hijacked German driver and
several French civilians. Later on in the withdrawal, when III/950 was approxi-
mately 150 kilometres north-east of Poitiers, three Indians raped a local French
girl. According to the report, the three concerned were initially sentenced to
death, but this appears not to have been carried out.43 A further outrage was
also reported from the village of St Dim, east of Tours. Here the infamous 3
Company lost one of their Indian officers, shot in an ambush. The company
rounded up the whole population, less the men, and razed the village. They then
handed those rounded up to the German units nearby. What is interesting is that
the Legion claimed to have killed a number of Maquis, including twenty-one
Indian POWs, who had escaped from the camp at Epinal when the Americans
accidentally bombed it a few months before.
The Indians continued their withdrawal eastward from the town of Tours,
passing through Bourges, Chalon-sur-Saône, Plombières and Geraldmer, not far
from the Alsace border. The Legion had been ordered to move to Freiburg, but
this was cancelled and they were ordered to Oberhofen, in Alsace itself. The
order came too late for 1/950, who were eventually stopped in the town of Selz.
The Legion had crossed the border on 17 September, reaching Oberhofen on
the 23rd. In little over five weeks they had travelled the 1100 kilometres from
Bordeaux, a lot of the time in contact. This was no mean feat in itself. Their
casualties had been light and, including a number of desertions, amounted to
only some two per cent of their total strength.44
The Germans wasted no time at all in announcing the successful withdrawal
of the Indians from the advancing Allied armies. On 1 October 1944, the
Germans organised a propaganda stunt through the medium of the Free India
Centre in Berlin. This was partly in response to the Allied claim that Indian
POWs had been coerced by the Germans to wear uniforms and be photographed
for German media consumption. The Allies had gone on to announce the
capture of many Indian renegades in France, and had declared the Indian unit
non-effective. Taken in the light of Bose's partial successes in the Far East, where
he had upwards of 40,000 Indians under command, this had been in the interests
of the Allies, although not strictly true. A party of four, the commanding officer
Obersdeutnant Krappe, one Indian officer and two NCOs, attended a press
conference and broadcast over German radio, describing some of their exploits
during the withdrawal. How successful all this was, so close to the final defeat,
can only be guessed at.45
43 PRO, H045/25829.
44 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , p. 188.
45 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 189-91.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 187
Within Germany, however, the Legion caught the eye of Himmler. He
already started to collect a number of the non-Germanic units into his S
the Indian Legion was to be no exception. While at Oberhofen, the Indian
been re-equipped and had been used to bolster the defence to the west of
Rhine, near Strasbourg. When the Americans started moving against thi
the Indians again withdrew, crossing the river by the Selz ferry. They w
temporarily stationed in the neighbourhood of Bretten, near Karlsruhe, b
finally moving to the training area at Heuberg. They arrived at the end of Dec
ber 1944. It was here that the Indians were eventually absorbed into t
taking on their final title, 'Der Indische Freiwilligen Legion der Waffen SS'.
As the Legion moved into the Heuberg area, Hitler launched his offen
through the Ardennes. The Legion was not involved, but a desperate orde
issued by Berlin saying that all units not directly involved in fighting at the f
were to surrender their weapons so that these could be moved forward.
included the Legion, who, after frantic calls to Berlin, were forced to co
Such a move must have had a devastating effect on the Indians. They had
deprived of the very means by which they could justify their existence. The d
of liberating India had finally vanished.
Becker also recalled his time at Heuberg. His MI5 report again:
Propaganda was very much intensified here. 'Bhai Band' came very
regularly and was very lavishly circulated . . . Political news and instruc-
tions from the German High Command were passed through to the
Legionnaires by means of lectures given both by German and Indian
Officers.46
The Indians remained at Heuberg until 12 April 1945. They then recei
orders to make their way, as best they could, towards the Swiss border,
from the advancing French and American armies who were sweeping eas
The Legion moved south-east to Singen, arriving on 20 April, and then du
along the shores of Lake Constance. With only their rifles and those panzer
they could obtain before leaving, the Indian Legion must have made a sorry
as they tried to avoid the encircling Allies. The Legion moved by battalion
First leading. They reached Bregenz, just inside the Austrian border, and
struck out for Sonthofen, via Immenstadt. On the night of 29/30 April,
Americans cut the line of the Legion's retreat. The Second and Third Batta
were forced to surrender, leaving only the First Battalion to continue its
eastward.
On 30 April, the remaining battalion approached the town of Weissenbach.
It was obvious that they could remain free for very little longer and so the order
was given to company commanders to disperse their men, telling them to
continue eastward and try to seek asylum where or whenever possible.47 Some
tried to make it to the border town of Feldkirch while others moved towards
46 PRO, H045/25829.
47 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 206-10.
1 88 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Innsbruck, not realising the Americans had already
the majority of the First Battalion surrendered in the
the Tyrol. Most of those that did evade capture w
Becker the English interpreter remained free for s
gation he described his escape thus:
In April 1945 [I] found myself with about one third
lake of BODENSEE (Lake Constance). We split up and I myself fled
to the mountains. When the truce came, I reported to the French Com-
mander at ROETENBACH and told him I was a British subject. I had
discarded my Wehrmacht uniform and was in civilian clothes. He gave
me a pass to Dresden . . . Subsequently I made my way to Berlin, then
Hamelin from where I went to Lüneburg. Here my case was examined
by the P.W.X. officers and I was embarked on the plane to Brussels . . .
On arrival in Brussels I was sent to a D.P. centre, and then . . . the Field
Security came and detained me.49
The Americans lost no time in handing over their captured Indians to the
French. This is understandable, as they must have had mixed feelings about the
Indians and their fight against British colonial rule. The French, on the other
hand, had no such qualms. They marched the Indians back along the shores of
Lake Constance, to the railhead at Lindau, where they entrained the majority
for Marseilles. From thence they would go to Taranto in southern Italy. Thirty-
seven Indian officers and senior NCOs, however, were moved to the British
interrogation centre at Cranwich, outside London.
At Taranto, the British utilised two former reinforcement camps. Camps 8
and 1 6, as repatriation camps for Indian troops and released POWs who were to
return home. Here, Indian Army Intelligence also screened everyone, trying to
find the renegades from the Legion. Once separated, the former Indian Legion
men were classified as either White, Grey or Black, depending on their involve-
ment. Black was for those fully committed to the Legion and involved in recruit-
ment, Grey for those who volunteered but did not recruit, while those classified
as White had been coerced to join against their will. The Marseilles party and
others screened out sailed from Taranto on 14 July, reaching Bombay on the
28th/29th. Here they were transferred to two trains and taken to Assaudah Prison
Camp, on the Delhi-Ferozepore line.
Assaudah Camp was divided into eight compounds, A to H. Compounds G
and H were separate from the others. On arrival, the Legion prisoners were again
separated, the Whites to compound B, Greys to C and the Blacks to D. With the
arrival of the Indians from England, the Blacks were transferred to cages G and
H. As can be imagined, it was not easy to control the prisoners, locked up as they
48 An account of the American and French actions can be found in Charles B. MacDonald, The
Last Offensive (United States Army, Washington, 1973).
49 PRO, H045/25829.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 189
were in their own country.50 The British authorities commenced their R
trials, primarily against those who had fought for the Japanese, on 5 No
1945. The courts martial of three Indian officers were presided over by M
General Blaxland, under whom were three British and three Indian office
Advocate-General of India acted as the Public Prosecutor. The findings w
promulgated on 3 January 1946, all three being found guilty, amongst
charges, of having waged war against the King-Emperor. All three were
sentenced to transportation for life, cashiering and forfeiture of all pa
allowances. Such was the political state of India at the time, however, that
the C-in-C, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, remitted the sentence of transporta-
tion.51
Further trials were also held, but by the beginning of February 1946 Indian
party politics had entered the fray, with various religious leaders claiming bias
in the courts. There had already been rioting in Calcutta during the previous
November, and further outbreaks occurred in the following February. These
were far more serious, leading to a mutiny by ratings of the Royal Indian Navy at
Bombay and Karachi. So great was the unrest caused by the trials, twenty-sevěn
in all by February, that the government abandoned all further proceedings on 2
May 1946. 52 As for those in the Assaudah camp, they were all released by the end
of March, the Whites and Greys being released first. Thus, as far as the German
Indian Legion was concerned, the story was over. India did gain her indepen-
dence from the British, in 1947, but not due to their direct efforts.
There remains one last detail, however, and that is the fate of their erstwhile
leader, Subhas Chandra Bose. Bose, as has been said, left Germany in February
1943 in a German U-boat. This rendezvoused with a Japanese submarine 1-29 in
the Indian Ocean, and Bose transferred across. From there, he was taken to
Sumatra and then on to Tokyo. Bose managed to continue his crusade and raised
another Indian National Army. Like their European comrades, the Indians fight-
ing for the Japanese were also soundly defeated. Bose is said to have had a wild
idea of transferring what remained of his forces to Russia, and duly set off for
Manchuria. On 18 August 1945, the aircraft he was travelling in crashed on take-
off from Formosa's Taipei Sungshan airfield. Bose was very badly burnt in the
crash, and died soon after.53
What, then, did Bose and his Indian Legion achieve in Europe? The answer
is not much. His vision of liberating India alongside his new German ally was an
unobtainable goal, especially from Europe. At the same time, the Germans were
by no means committed to his enterprise and merely used him for propaganda
purposes. When German commanders refused to have the Legion at the front
with them, as Rommel did in North Africa, it was doomed as a viable fighting
force. This was confirmed by their subsequent actions in Holland and France.
50 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 150-1, 230-1.
51 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30 Mar. - 6 Apr. 1946, p. 7821.
52 Keesing , p. 8745.
53 Corr, War of the Springing Tigers , pp. 170-1.
190 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Where Bose did succeed, however, was in reaffirming t
really had come to quit India. Bose, in comparison
mere pinprick in the British side, but his actions ce
either by the British or the Indians.
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Bose's absence had been noticed but no one had told
Word got round that the Legion was to be used on
soon quashed by the Legion's German colonel, Obers
fellow officers. When, however, the true destinatio
Battalions was known, namely Holland, via the Beve
gium, 3 Company of the First Battalion refused t
quickly, court-martialling forty-seven Indians and ac
great was the number of Indians undergoing militar
unit had to be left behind to administer them.31
The first Indian troops entrained for Belgium on
behind the Third Battalion to complete its basic tra
going to use the Indians for coastal defence, primaril
in Belgium was for one final field exercise and lasted
go unnoticed, however. MI2 informed the Director of
War Office that:
CX Report shows . . . Indians arrived BEVERLOO CAMP. Same
report shows Green-White-Orange flash is in form of shield with tiger
superimposed.32
At the end of April, the First and Second Battalions of Infantry Regiment
950, as the Legion was now called, moved to Holland. The First Battalion (1/950
IR) was stationed on the coast at Zandvoort while the Second (11/950 IR) was
sent to the Friesian island of Texel. A month later, in May, the Third Battalion
(III/950 IR) left Königsbrück and took post at Oldebruck, where it continued its
field training. The Becker report stated:
He [Becker] was transferred in March 43 to 3 Bn Staff as an interpreter
and a clerk. In Jul. 43 he left with 3 Bn Staff for Holland. They went to
Oldebrouck. He says there were no propaganda or visits by any Indian
civilians . . . except once when GANPULEY visited 3 Bn HQ and
inspected it. 3 Bn was engaged in A/Tk, Rifle and Infantry trg during
this period.33
Life cannot have been much fun for the Indians, posted as they were on the
coast of the North Sea. They were not being used to liberate India, and the preju-
dices of the local Nazis were also surfacing - the mayor of Zandvoort going so far
as to put up posters around the town, warning the female population in general
not to consort with non-Germanic troops!34
In August 1943, the Indians were probably very glad to be told that they
31 Philip Buss, notes to the author, and PRO, H045/25829.
32 PRO, W0208/808. Singh Mangat blamed the troubles on agitators within the Legion, The
Tiger Strikes, pp. 134-5.
33 PRO, H045/25829. The Becker report would suggest that HQ 3 Bn staff were the last to leave
for Holland, not surprising as the Legion still had a number of rear parties at Königsbrück.
34 Gen. J. J. de Wolf to Philip Buss.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 1 83
were being moved to the French Atlantic coast, between Bordeaux and the
Spanish border, under command of the German 344th Infantry Division.35 Here,
as in Holland, the battalions were widely separated. Regimental Headquarters
and 1/950 were stationed at Lacanau, 11/950 at Nantes while III/950 went to
Biarritz. So great were the distances between battalions that regimental command
was found to be too difficult. Within weeks, the battalions were moved closer to
Regimental Headquarters. Consequently, 1/950 moved to Houtrin and III/950 to
the area around Lege. 11/950 was withdrawn from coastal duties and moved
inland to a reserve position at Souge. From then on, the coastal battalions always
operated with two companies forward, the remainder of the battalion acting as
reserve further inland.
It would appear that the Indians settled down to their coastal defence duties
quite well, although there were instances of ill-discipline, primarily due to the
German lack of awareness with regard to Indian customs, and because the
Germans still insisted that only German officers would lead the regiment. Unfor-
tunately, it was again 3 Company of 1/950 that caused all the trouble. Soon after,
however, on 1 October 1943, the German authorities relented and the Indians
elected their first twelve commissioned officers from within their own ranks.36
By the beginning of 1944, the tide was definitely turning against the Axis
powers. North Africa had been won by the Allies, as had the first stepping-stone
into Europe, Sicily. From here the Allies had invaded Italy, now totally under
German control after the surrender of the Italians in September 1943. The
second front could not be far away, and the Germans knew it. Despite the now
desperate odds, the Germans and their remaining allies fought a dogged battle,
none more so than in Italy. The Germans soon realised that they were facing the
British 8th Army and, consequently, Indian units. Two parties from the Legion
were despatched to Italy for propaganda work. The first departed in January 1944
and was attached to Kesselring's Headquarters. Their task was threefold: to man
wireless stations broadcasting to the Allies, organise leaflet raids and interrogate
Indian POWs. This party was to remain in Italy until March 1945. The second
party despatched to Italy consisted of a complete company, 9 Company. Singh
Mangat says that they were found to be very useful by the Germans as the British
would move their own Indian troops to another part of the front. This sounds
a trifle implausible. The only real value the Indians could have been was as a
propaganda stunt. Indeed, 9 Company had been reported as useless by their
company commander, having been in the front lines opposite the Polish division.
The company only lost one man throughout the tour and subsequently returned
to the Legion in January 1945. 37
An insight into the Legion at this time can be gleaned from an Indian Army
Intelligence report, quoting a letter from a German soldier:
35 See Georg Tessili, Verbände und Truppen der Deutchen Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Zweiten
Weltkreig 1939-1945 (Biblio Verlag, Osnabrück, 1976), xiii, 153.
36 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 154-5.
37 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 165-7.
1 84 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
So here are we 4 alone . . . with the company we a
Indian Company, all Indians . . . All romantic fell
thick beards and plaits. They all wear khaki unifor
shorts, light shoes and the Africa cap. First class e
got. Above all marvellous food . . . they live like
Against this the real value of the troops is nothi
with kid gloves. If a hard word is said to them they r
they are volunteers and only German soldiers for
. . . The German personnel are all men picked for the
During the early summer of 1944, prior to the Nor
Regiment 950 underwent another organisational change, in line with most
German units. Each battalion lost its heavy weapons company in direct support,
this being broken up and distributed to one of three new companies formed
under regimental control. These were 13 Company with the howitzers and
mortars, 14 Company with the anti-tank guns and panzerfaustņ and 15 Company,
the pioneer company. At the same time these changes were implemented, the
Legion set up its own recruiting and training organisation, under III/950
command, to try and boost its manpower. Many of the POWs targeted had
arrived from Italy in the early winter of 1943 and were now housed at Limburg.
Many were transferred to a camp at Epinal, in France, making them very accessible
to the Legion.
The camp at Epinal soon earned itself a name amongst Indian prisoners.
The recruitment methods appear not to have been as pleasant as those at
Frankenburg or Königsbrück. A short report from Switzerland to MI9, dated 25
July 1944, ran as follows:
20616 Sepoy Fahorn Silangan, 2 A/Tk Bty, 2nd Indian Field Regiment
states:
(a) He was court-martialled on April 1 5th 1 944 at Epinal on a charge
striking a soldier while in Stalag 4D September 2nd 1943 and sentenc
to be shot.
(b) The case against him trumped up by . . . two . . . Indians from his
own village who had joined the German Indian Legion and who gave
false evidence against him.
(c) He was offered release several times if he would join the German
Indian Legion.39
While German and other Axis units fought hard to counter the Normandy
landings, those in central and southern France found themselves facing increased
'Maquis' activity, especially attacks against the road and rail systems. Conse-
quently, 11/950 was warned off for anti-partisan duties and moved sixty kilo-
metres inland, its old coastal positions being taken up by III/950, then still in
38 PRO, WO208/818.
39 PRO, W0208/808.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 185
reserve at Souge. (By this date, the Legion was under command of the G
159th Reserve Infantry Division.40) 11/950 found itself at Saumos, moving
on 23 July. After a short rest, the battalion was again moved, this time to
Jaloux, close to the Mont de Marsan, a Resistance enclave. The battalion ar
during the night of 26/27 July and was soon warned off for an operation
a suspected Maquis camp nearby. The attack was to be on 2 August. Lucki
perhaps, for the Indians, the French were aware of the impending assaul
Indian point sections did find the camp, where they came across evidenc
hurried withdrawal.41
The Legion's anti-partisan activities came to an abrupt halt when the A
landed in southern France. The Germans, fearing the obvious pincer move
ordered a complete evacuation from central and southern France. The Ind
Legion was duly warned and the First and Third Battalions left their coa
positions on 1 5 August. It would appear that only part of the regiment moved
rail, bound for Libourne. Those that moved by foot were directed to Ango
Two days later, the Second Battalion was also ordered to withdraw, movi
Bazas, with its 6 Company moving from a position near Captieux. On nea
their initial destinations, orders were received to the effect that the complete
ment was to withdraw towards the German border at Alsace. For the Indians,
and their remaining German officers, the withdrawal must have been plagued
with problems. Motorised transport was at a premium, with only the battalion
support companies being lorry-borne. 11/950 was lucky to have bicycles while the
other two battalions had to move on foot.
On reaching their initial positions, the whole of the Legion was directed on
to Poitiers, with a halt en route at Ruffec. It was here that the Indians were to
experience their first true action against the Maquis in what was to turn into a
running battle through central France.
The Indians, along with other German units, arrived on 18 August. Local
intelligence told them that the Maquis were planning an attack against the town
and, consequently, the Indians started to dig in. Within a short space of time, a
loudspeaker van approached 5 Company positions and started broadcasting in
Hindustani, urging the Indians to surrender. This van was later ambushed. Soon
after, the main attack materialised and the guns of 13 Company came into action,
forcing the Maquis to withdraw. For this action, two Indians were decorated.
Gian Singh, a platoon commander and Banta Singh who had commanded the
artillery. Both men were awarded the Vir-e-Hind and Tamgha-e-Bahaduri in
silver with swords, by the Free India Centre in Berlin, while the Germans
awarded them both the Iron Cross, Second Class.42
Throughout the remaining days of August and well into September, the
Indians made their way towards the German border. Virtually every day, at least
one of the companies would be in contact with the enemy. Soon the strain began
40Tessin, Verbände und Truppen , xiii, 153.
41 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , pp. 174-6.
42 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 165-7.
1 86 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
to show amongst the Indians and their officers, bo
to lose control. Reports of rape and general pillage
Allies from the Resistance.
There had been an incident at Angoulême station, where the Maquis
attempted to attack the train from a hijacked car. In the ensuing fire-fight, the
Indians not only killed their attackers, but also the hijacked German driver and
several French civilians. Later on in the withdrawal, when III/950 was approxi-
mately 150 kilometres north-east of Poitiers, three Indians raped a local French
girl. According to the report, the three concerned were initially sentenced to
death, but this appears not to have been carried out.43 A further outrage was
also reported from the village of St Dim, east of Tours. Here the infamous 3
Company lost one of their Indian officers, shot in an ambush. The company
rounded up the whole population, less the men, and razed the village. They then
handed those rounded up to the German units nearby. What is interesting is that
the Legion claimed to have killed a number of Maquis, including twenty-one
Indian POWs, who had escaped from the camp at Epinal when the Americans
accidentally bombed it a few months before.
The Indians continued their withdrawal eastward from the town of Tours,
passing through Bourges, Chalon-sur-Saône, Plombières and Geraldmer, not far
from the Alsace border. The Legion had been ordered to move to Freiburg, but
this was cancelled and they were ordered to Oberhofen, in Alsace itself. The
order came too late for 1/950, who were eventually stopped in the town of Selz.
The Legion had crossed the border on 17 September, reaching Oberhofen on
the 23rd. In little over five weeks they had travelled the 1100 kilometres from
Bordeaux, a lot of the time in contact. This was no mean feat in itself. Their
casualties had been light and, including a number of desertions, amounted to
only some two per cent of their total strength.44
The Germans wasted no time at all in announcing the successful withdrawal
of the Indians from the advancing Allied armies. On 1 October 1944, the
Germans organised a propaganda stunt through the medium of the Free India
Centre in Berlin. This was partly in response to the Allied claim that Indian
POWs had been coerced by the Germans to wear uniforms and be photographed
for German media consumption. The Allies had gone on to announce the
capture of many Indian renegades in France, and had declared the Indian unit
non-effective. Taken in the light of Bose's partial successes in the Far East, where
he had upwards of 40,000 Indians under command, this had been in the interests
of the Allies, although not strictly true. A party of four, the commanding officer
Obersdeutnant Krappe, one Indian officer and two NCOs, attended a press
conference and broadcast over German radio, describing some of their exploits
during the withdrawal. How successful all this was, so close to the final defeat,
can only be guessed at.45
43 PRO, H045/25829.
44 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes , p. 188.
45 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 189-91.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 187
Within Germany, however, the Legion caught the eye of Himmler. He
already started to collect a number of the non-Germanic units into his S
the Indian Legion was to be no exception. While at Oberhofen, the Indian
been re-equipped and had been used to bolster the defence to the west of
Rhine, near Strasbourg. When the Americans started moving against thi
the Indians again withdrew, crossing the river by the Selz ferry. They w
temporarily stationed in the neighbourhood of Bretten, near Karlsruhe, b
finally moving to the training area at Heuberg. They arrived at the end of Dec
ber 1944. It was here that the Indians were eventually absorbed into t
taking on their final title, 'Der Indische Freiwilligen Legion der Waffen SS'.
As the Legion moved into the Heuberg area, Hitler launched his offen
through the Ardennes. The Legion was not involved, but a desperate orde
issued by Berlin saying that all units not directly involved in fighting at the f
were to surrender their weapons so that these could be moved forward.
included the Legion, who, after frantic calls to Berlin, were forced to co
Such a move must have had a devastating effect on the Indians. They had
deprived of the very means by which they could justify their existence. The d
of liberating India had finally vanished.
Becker also recalled his time at Heuberg. His MI5 report again:
Propaganda was very much intensified here. 'Bhai Band' came very
regularly and was very lavishly circulated . . . Political news and instruc-
tions from the German High Command were passed through to the
Legionnaires by means of lectures given both by German and Indian
Officers.46
The Indians remained at Heuberg until 12 April 1945. They then recei
orders to make their way, as best they could, towards the Swiss border,
from the advancing French and American armies who were sweeping eas
The Legion moved south-east to Singen, arriving on 20 April, and then du
along the shores of Lake Constance. With only their rifles and those panzer
they could obtain before leaving, the Indian Legion must have made a sorry
as they tried to avoid the encircling Allies. The Legion moved by battalion
First leading. They reached Bregenz, just inside the Austrian border, and
struck out for Sonthofen, via Immenstadt. On the night of 29/30 April,
Americans cut the line of the Legion's retreat. The Second and Third Batta
were forced to surrender, leaving only the First Battalion to continue its
eastward.
On 30 April, the remaining battalion approached the town of Weissenbach.
It was obvious that they could remain free for very little longer and so the order
was given to company commanders to disperse their men, telling them to
continue eastward and try to seek asylum where or whenever possible.47 Some
tried to make it to the border town of Feldkirch while others moved towards
46 PRO, H045/25829.
47 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 206-10.
1 88 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Innsbruck, not realising the Americans had already
the majority of the First Battalion surrendered in the
the Tyrol. Most of those that did evade capture w
Becker the English interpreter remained free for s
gation he described his escape thus:
In April 1945 [I] found myself with about one third
lake of BODENSEE (Lake Constance). We split up and I myself fled
to the mountains. When the truce came, I reported to the French Com-
mander at ROETENBACH and told him I was a British subject. I had
discarded my Wehrmacht uniform and was in civilian clothes. He gave
me a pass to Dresden . . . Subsequently I made my way to Berlin, then
Hamelin from where I went to Lüneburg. Here my case was examined
by the P.W.X. officers and I was embarked on the plane to Brussels . . .
On arrival in Brussels I was sent to a D.P. centre, and then . . . the Field
Security came and detained me.49
The Americans lost no time in handing over their captured Indians to the
French. This is understandable, as they must have had mixed feelings about the
Indians and their fight against British colonial rule. The French, on the other
hand, had no such qualms. They marched the Indians back along the shores of
Lake Constance, to the railhead at Lindau, where they entrained the majority
for Marseilles. From thence they would go to Taranto in southern Italy. Thirty-
seven Indian officers and senior NCOs, however, were moved to the British
interrogation centre at Cranwich, outside London.
At Taranto, the British utilised two former reinforcement camps. Camps 8
and 1 6, as repatriation camps for Indian troops and released POWs who were to
return home. Here, Indian Army Intelligence also screened everyone, trying to
find the renegades from the Legion. Once separated, the former Indian Legion
men were classified as either White, Grey or Black, depending on their involve-
ment. Black was for those fully committed to the Legion and involved in recruit-
ment, Grey for those who volunteered but did not recruit, while those classified
as White had been coerced to join against their will. The Marseilles party and
others screened out sailed from Taranto on 14 July, reaching Bombay on the
28th/29th. Here they were transferred to two trains and taken to Assaudah Prison
Camp, on the Delhi-Ferozepore line.
Assaudah Camp was divided into eight compounds, A to H. Compounds G
and H were separate from the others. On arrival, the Legion prisoners were again
separated, the Whites to compound B, Greys to C and the Blacks to D. With the
arrival of the Indians from England, the Blacks were transferred to cages G and
H. As can be imagined, it was not easy to control the prisoners, locked up as they
48 An account of the American and French actions can be found in Charles B. MacDonald, The
Last Offensive (United States Army, Washington, 1973).
49 PRO, H045/25829.
INFANTRY REGIMENT 950 - GERMANY'S INDIAN LEGION 189
were in their own country.50 The British authorities commenced their R
trials, primarily against those who had fought for the Japanese, on 5 No
1945. The courts martial of three Indian officers were presided over by M
General Blaxland, under whom were three British and three Indian office
Advocate-General of India acted as the Public Prosecutor. The findings w
promulgated on 3 January 1946, all three being found guilty, amongst
charges, of having waged war against the King-Emperor. All three were
sentenced to transportation for life, cashiering and forfeiture of all pa
allowances. Such was the political state of India at the time, however, that
the C-in-C, General Sir Claude Auchinleck, remitted the sentence of transporta-
tion.51
Further trials were also held, but by the beginning of February 1946 Indian
party politics had entered the fray, with various religious leaders claiming bias
in the courts. There had already been rioting in Calcutta during the previous
November, and further outbreaks occurred in the following February. These
were far more serious, leading to a mutiny by ratings of the Royal Indian Navy at
Bombay and Karachi. So great was the unrest caused by the trials, twenty-sevěn
in all by February, that the government abandoned all further proceedings on 2
May 1946. 52 As for those in the Assaudah camp, they were all released by the end
of March, the Whites and Greys being released first. Thus, as far as the German
Indian Legion was concerned, the story was over. India did gain her indepen-
dence from the British, in 1947, but not due to their direct efforts.
There remains one last detail, however, and that is the fate of their erstwhile
leader, Subhas Chandra Bose. Bose, as has been said, left Germany in February
1943 in a German U-boat. This rendezvoused with a Japanese submarine 1-29 in
the Indian Ocean, and Bose transferred across. From there, he was taken to
Sumatra and then on to Tokyo. Bose managed to continue his crusade and raised
another Indian National Army. Like their European comrades, the Indians fight-
ing for the Japanese were also soundly defeated. Bose is said to have had a wild
idea of transferring what remained of his forces to Russia, and duly set off for
Manchuria. On 18 August 1945, the aircraft he was travelling in crashed on take-
off from Formosa's Taipei Sungshan airfield. Bose was very badly burnt in the
crash, and died soon after.53
What, then, did Bose and his Indian Legion achieve in Europe? The answer
is not much. His vision of liberating India alongside his new German ally was an
unobtainable goal, especially from Europe. At the same time, the Germans were
by no means committed to his enterprise and merely used him for propaganda
purposes. When German commanders refused to have the Legion at the front
with them, as Rommel did in North Africa, it was doomed as a viable fighting
force. This was confirmed by their subsequent actions in Holland and France.
50 Singh Mangat, The Tiger Strikes, pp. 150-1, 230-1.
51 See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 30 Mar. - 6 Apr. 1946, p. 7821.
52 Keesing , p. 8745.
53 Corr, War of the Springing Tigers , pp. 170-1.
190 ARMY HISTORICAL RESEARCH
Where Bose did succeed, however, was in reaffirming t
really had come to quit India. Bose, in comparison
mere pinprick in the British side, but his actions ce
either by the British or the Indians.
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