Dont forget to watch this rare color video cilp of Indian Independence: ... The plan initially was to transfer power from Britain to India by June 1948. ... This was certainly not something expected by Mountbatten and hence such circumstances ...
WHY BRITISH RAN AWAY BEFORE THAT DATE? [1]Britain’s total war debt of
3 billion pounds in 1945 money, 1.25 billion was owed to India and
never actually paid. [2]
The Royal Indian Navy revolt encompasses a total strike and subsequent revolt by Indian ... After the Second World War, three officers of the Indian National Army (INA), .... the mutiny which argued that the unrest of the sailors was not best expressed ... The British in 1948 branded the 1946 Indian Naval Mutiny as a “larger ... History of India
On
the 21st of February 1946, mutiny broke out on board the Royal Indian
Navy sloop, H.M.I.S. Hindustan. The 2nd Battalion of the Black watch was
called ... =============================================== 20 Loaves and A Forgotten Mutiny | History Under Your Feet
And
soon it spread, to Kochi, Vizag, Kolkata, officers who opposed the
strike were thrown off ships, and the mutineers used radio sets to
communicate among themselves. HMIS Talwar became the epicenter
In March, 1976 P.V.Chakraborty, former Chief Justice of Kolkata HC
wrote a letter, where he described a correspondence between him and the
British Prime Minister Clement Atlee in 1956. Atlee often mocked by
Churchill as a “Modest man, with much to be modest about”, was visiting
India in 1956, after it became independent. And during his visit, met
Chakraborty, who was then acting Governor of West Bengal, and was asked
“The Quit India Movement of Gandhi practically died out long before
1947 and there was nothing in the Indian situation at that time, which
made it necessary for the British to leave India in a hurry. Why then
did they do so?”. Atlee gave out several reasons, one was Netaji
Subash Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, which weakened their army,
and the other was the Royal Indian Navy Mutiny. And when Chakraborty
asked him about impact of Gandhiji’s 1942 Quit India movement, Atlee
wryly remarked with a smile “Minimal”.
I had mentioned this earlier in my article on Netaji about impact of INA, and am quoting an excerpt from that article.
But it could not prevent mutinies from breaking out in
the British Army , especially the one by the Indian soldiers of the
Royal Navy. Chennai, Pune, Jabalpur all saw the Indian soldiers rising
in mutiny. The British often used the Indian soldiers as cannon
fodder, they did all the dirty work, were the persons on front line in
conflict and in many World Wars, many Indian soldiers died fighting
for the British empire. Yet in grant for this, the British, treated
the Indian soldiers as second class citizens, and exploited them. It
was Bose’s Indian National Army which sparked the uprising. Years
later Clement Atlee , cited the revolts of the Indian Army, as a major
decision, to grant independence. Britain already economically and
militarily weakened, after WW2, knew that it could no longer trust the
Indian armed forces to prop up it’s Raj. So in a way, Bose,
contributed significantly to the end of the Raj.
Royal Naval Ratings Mutiny, or what is often called the forgotten
mutiny in India’s history, an event which unlike the 1857 mutiny or the
Quit India movement, does not really strike much resonance, except among
hard core historians. Or Leftists, since they were the only ones to
have backed this whole heartedly. The Beginning.
Like the 1857 Mutiny, the 1946 Royal Naval ratings mutiny had a rather
mundane beginning. It was not an overnight event however, the
resentment was building up among the naval ratings, and other Indian
members of the Army. The INA was the most serious of all that really
shook the faith of the British. Not that well known is something called
the Royal Air Force Mutiny that also took place in 1946, over the
working conditions, and demobilization of British troops after the end
of the war.
The Naval Ratings
The beginnings of the Naval Ratings Mutiny were in an event that
occurred on Jan 16, 1946 when a contingent of Naval ratings arrived at
the Castle Barracks in Mint Road of Mumbai’s Fort Area. This contingent
was from the training ship HMIS Akbar, that was at Thane, and it was
around evening 4 PM. On being informed of the arrival of the contingent,
the galley cook, took out 20 loaves of bread, casually added some water
to the mutton curry as well as the dal, that was from the previous day
and served it. The food was so tasteless and substandard that only 17
of the ratings took it, the rest of them went ashore.
This was not a one off incident, such neglect was quite common, and what
was even worse, repeated complaints to senior officers of the working
conditions, did not elicit any response. As the complaints became
galore, the ratings were more and more frustrated, both with the
conditions as well with the indifference of the higher ups. Adding fuel
to the fire was the trial of the INA leaders, Netaji Subash Chandra
Bose fight for freedom and the exploits of INA during Siege of Imphal
began to be fed to the ratings. It gave them a sort of inspiration, and
hope that the mighty British empire was not that invincible.
HMIS Kumaon
The Events
On Feb 18, 1946, Naval Rating M.S.Khan led the revolt on HMS Talwar, and
a strike committee was formed. In Karachi, ratings began the revolt on
HMIS Hindustan, anchored off the Manora Island. M.S.Khan and another
naval rating Madan Singh, had by now taken control of the mutiny, and it
began to spread. By Feb 19, ratings from Castle and Fort Barracks had
joined the revolt. Ratings left their posts, and began to go around in
Bombay on trucks carrying pictures of Netaji Subash Chandra Bose, who
by now had become their inspiration.
And soon it spread, to Kochi, Vizag, Kolkata, officers who opposed the
strike were thrown off ships, and the mutineers used radio sets to
communicate among themselves. HMIS Talwar became the epicenter for the
mutiny as the strikers used the radio sets to send messages to and fro
between themselves. It was a perfectly co-ordinated revolt, that was now
striking back. And soon the other workers in the Navy too joined, from
the sloops, the minesweepers and the offshore establishments in Mumbai,
along Hornby Road, near CST, now the Dadabhai Naoroji Road. The White
Ensign of the British was lowered from all the ships, and British
officers were singled out for attack by mutineers, using hockey sticks,
crowbars and whatever else they could lay their hands on.
Flora Fountain soon reverberated with cries of Jai Hind, and slogans
of liberation. British officers and their wives were forced to shout
Jai Hind by the protestors. The Taj Mahal Hotel, Yatch club all had guns
trained on them throughout the day. The Royal Indian Air Force joined
in solidarity with the striking ratings, and 1000 men from Andheri,
Marine Drive camps came in. The Gurkhas in Karachi, one of the sword
arms of the British army, refused to fire on the mutineers. The mutiny
now began to spread like wildfire, Kolkata, Vizag, Chennai, Karachi,
reverberated with slogans of “Strike for Bombay”, “Release 11,000 INA
prisoners” and “Jai Hind“.
The tricolor was now flying on all the ships, and by Feb 20, British
destroyers positioned themselves near the Gateway of India. The British
Govt, now headed by Clement Atleee, was alarmed, orders were given to
the Royal Navy to put down the revolt. Admiral J.H.Godfrey, the Flag
Officer in command of the Royal Indian Navy, gave an ultimatum to the
mutineers to submit or perish. On the other side, a wave of patriotic
fervor,surged ahead in support of the mutineers. The mutineers had
taken control of all the ships and were prepared for a last ditch stand
from the clerks to the cleaning hands to cooks and wireless operators,
every single Indian was ready for the battle.
On Day 3, the Royal Air Force flew a squadron of bombers near Mumbai
harbor, while Admiral Arthur Rullion, issued an ultimatum, asking the
mutineers to surrender unconditionally. In the meantime, the 2nd
Battalion of the Black Watch, silently managed to secure the island of
Manora near Karachi.
Soon the decision was made to engage HMIS Hindustan in a straight
confrontation, which was now under the control of the mutineers. The
ultimatum was given by the Royal Artillery on Manora island, to either
surrender or be prepared for war. At 10:33 AM, the guns began to fire on
HMIS Hindustan, and the naval ratings returned the fire. However they
could not hold on for long, and by 10:51 they surrendered and HMIS
Hindustan was taken over by the British. Soon HMIS Bahadur and Himalaya
were subdued, and taken over by the British, and the revolt at Karachi
was put down.
With increasing bombardment and not much hope in winning a long drawn
war, the mutineers began to surrender, and on Day 4, negotiations took
place, where most of the strikers demands were conceded in principle.
Immediate steps were taken to improve the quality of the food, and
living conditions, and assurance was given, that release of INA
prisoners would be considered favorably. 7 RIN sailors and 1 officer was
killed, while around 34 were injured and 476 discharged from duty. The Betrayal.
Sadly the mutineers got no support at all from the Indian National
Congress as usual, in fact they were even condemned for their actions.
Mahatma Gandhi issued a statement condemning the mutineers for revolting
without any guidance from a political party. One of the lone voices in
the Congress who supported the mutineers was Aruna Asaf Ali, who said
she would rather unite Hindus and Muslims on the barricades. The Muslim
League too denounced the mutineers, arguing that unrest on the streets
was not the best way to deal with grievances and it should be through
constitutional methods only. One reason could be that spontaneous
uprisings like these threatened the centralized political authority of
both Congress and Muslim League, and affected the dealings with the
British Govt. One more reason was that neither Congress nor Muslim
League was genuinely a mass based party, they still remained a preserve
of the upper class, upper caste, elite, and these kind of mass upsurges
left them uncomfortable.
The only political party that supported the mutineers was the
Communist Party of India then, all others just left them in the lurch.
Both Sardar Patel and Md.Ali Jinnah were united in their condemnation of
the mutineers actions, and Aruna Asaf Ali was the lone voice from
Congress in support of them. The mutineers faced court martial and
imprisonment on surrender, and what was worse even after independence,
they received no support from either the Govts of India or Pakistan.
The Royal Naval Ratings Mutiny lasted only for 4 days and was put
down swiftly, however the impact went much beyond.The British were now
fully convinced, that they could no longer trust the Armed forces to
maintain their control over India. So far the British managed to hold on
to India, through the Armed forces, but when they began to revolt, they
knew their time was up. First the INA revolts and then the Naval
Ratings mutiny, add to it the revolts in the Air Force too, plus the
fact that Britian was effectively pauperized after World War II, all
influenced their decision to quit India, much more than that 1942
movement.
Farewell To India - 1st Battalion Somerset Light Infantry Leave India (1948)
==============================================
Related story -
mutiny by British Indian soldiers 1946 at Jabbalpore
Monday, September 12, 2016
THE JUBBULPORE MUTINY – 1946
CHAPTER - 9
THE JUBBULPORE
MUTINY – 1946
The
mutiny at Jubbulpore took place between 27 February and 3 March 1946, about two
weeks after the Naval mutiny at Bombay.
The men who participated in the mutiny were all Indian Signal Corps personnel
posted at the Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore (now called Jabalpur). According to official sources,
1716 men were involved in the mutiny. The immediate provocation for the revolt
was the firing on the naval ratings at Bombay
and the harsh punishments awarded to the INA prisoners after the trials at the
Red Fort. The men also had certain grievances concerning pay, food and
accommodation that they placed before their superior officers and were agitated
when these were not heard. The uprising was peaceful and the participants did
not resort to violence of any kind. Like the naval mutiny at Bombay
and Karachi, the Jubbulpore
revolt was put down with an iron hand, by using British troops. There was no
firing, but a bayonet charge that left about 70 men injured, and three dead.
Though
the mutiny at Jubbulpore was at that time not
considered as ‘serious’ as the Naval mutiny, its repercussions were immense.
The earlier revolts in the RIAF and RIN, though more widespread and larger in
scale, did not really worry the British authorities, because the Indian Army,
on which they depended for meeting external and internal threats was still
considered reliable, having proved its fidelity during World War II. The mutiny
at Jubbulpore was the first major uprising in
the Indian Army during or after the war. This set alarm bells ringing from Delhi to London,
and doubts began to be expressed on the steadfastness of the Indian Army.
Ultimately, it forced Britain
to reach a settlement with the political parties and quit India.
After
the end of World War II there was feeling of uncertainty among soldiers, with
the threat of demobilisation and loss of livelihood being matters of serious
concern. The return of a large number of troops from British colonies in
South-East Asia aggravated the situation, with military stations in India
overwhelmed with troops for whom there was little work and no accommodation.
This led to severe overcrowding and a fall in standards of hygiene, food and
discipline, the latter due to lack of employment. During the war, most of the
men had been serving in operational areas, remaining ignorant or unaware of the
political situation in the country. The demands for independence from British
rule escalated after the 1942 Quit India agitation, and the end of the war raised
expectations in the minds of the public that freedom was imminent. Most of the
men went home on leave for the first time after the war, and learned of the
momentous political events that had taken place during the last three or four
years. The INA trials also played a part in kindling among soldiers ‘political
consciousness’, of which they had no earlier experience.
In February 1946, there were two
major establishments of the Indian Signal Corps at Jubbulpore.
The first was the Signal Training Centre (STC) comprising No. 1 Signal Training
Battalion (Military) and 2 & 3 Signal Battalions (Technical). The second
was the Indian Signal Depot & Records, which comprised the Indian Signals
Depot; the Indian Signals Demobilisation Centre and the Indian Signals Records.
The Commandant of the STC was Colonel L.C. Boyd, while Colonel R.T.H. Gelston,
commanded the Depot & Records. Both these establishments came under the
Jubbulpore Area, commanded by Brigadier H.U. Richards, who also commanded 17
Indian Infantry Brigade. The Area came under the General Officer Commanding
Nagpur District, Major General F.H. Skinner, with his headquarters at Nagpur. Headquarters
Central Command was then located at Agra.
Conditions
at Jubbulpore were no different from those at
other military stations, except that the men, being mostly from technical
trades, were more educated. Many of the men undergoing long training courses
were not sure whether they would be retained or sent home in the next few
months. The delay in announcement of a clear policy on demobilisation had
created an air of uncertainty and restlessness, which could not remain
unnoticed. On 27 November 1945, Colonel Boyd had written to the Organisation
Directorate in General Headquarters (India), bringing this to their
notice. He wrote: 1
It is for consideration whether the present policy of continuing to put
men under lengthy courses of training, irrespective of the time they are likely
to remain in the Army, is not extremely wasteful both of instructors’ time and
Government..… Among these men unsettlement and lack of interest in their work
are already noticeable, since they think they will be released form the Army
before their course finishes. It should also be noted that it is the highly
educated men such as are enrolled for Group ‘A’ trades that are keenest to
leave the Army at the earliest possible moment in order to obtain highly
remunerative employment.….To carry on with Workshops and Operator training in
these circumstances seems to be a waste of time. The unsettlement in squads
already referred to is having an adverse effect on training …
It was almost three months before
General Headquarters (India), replied to Colonel Boyd’s letter, ordering the
immediate release of one thousand recruits then under training at the Indian
Signal Training Centre at Jubbulpore and Bangalore.3 By the time the
orders reached the STC the mutiny had started. Referring to the letter in his
report to the Area Headquarters after the mutiny, Colonel Boyd lamented: ‘It is
unfortunate that the decision contained therein could not have been come to
earlier’.3
Even
if the decision to release the thousand men had been taken earlier, it would
have been difficult for the Signal Training Centres to cope with such large
numbers. The Signals Depot was then not authorised a demob centre; it was
making do with an ad hoc demob centre that had a capacity to release only 70
persons in a day. The staff of the depot was already overworked and the
additional load would have stretched them to the limit. The severe overcrowding
and unsatisfactory living conditions only added to the unrest. The shortage of
staff affected management of security in the area, and the men had free access
to civilian areas. The Signal Training Centre, Depot and Records employed large
numbers of civilians, through whom political developments found their way into
the military camp and the idle minds of the men, easily converting them into
‘devils’ workshops’.
At
that time, units were given cash to purchase condiments, which were not being
supplied with rations. There had been a delay in purchase of condiments with
the resultant deterioration in the quality of food being prepared in the langars
(Other Ranks messes in the Indian Army are generally called thus. The term
is taken from the free kitchen in a gurudwara, the place of worship for
Sikhs). The personnel responsible for purchasing condiments were often corrupt,
and the quantity and quality of condiments was much below the prescribed
standards. This applied also to the rations supplied to the men through the
supply depot manned by the Royal Indian Army Service Corps. Other then rations,
even other stores and amenities authorised to the men were frequently pilfered.
The general standard of the men’s cookhouses, living quarters, bathrooms and
urinals was poor. Unlike in operational units, there was very little contact
between the officers and the men, whose grievances often went unnoticed or
unredressed. The quality of Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) and
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) posted in instructional appointments in the
STC was usually good, but the same could not be said of the supervisory staff
responsible for administration, some of whom had been in Jubbulpore for several
years, developing a callous attitude towards the men and their problems.
A
feature unique to technical arms such as the Indian Signal Corps was the
presence of a large number of British soldiers in every unit and
establishment.
Before the war, most of the technical trades in the Indian Signal Corps
were
open only to British Other Ranks (BOR), with Indian Other Ranks being
eligible
for the ‘lower’ trades such as operator visual, despatch rider, lineman,
MT
driver etc. Before the war, the Indian Signal Corps comprised about two
thousand BOR, with the number of IOR being almost twice that number.
When the
war ended, the number of BOR had gone up ten times to almost twenty
thousand,
while the number of IOR had grown thirty times to sixty thousand. The
rapid
expansion of the Corps necessitated several new trades being opened to
Indians,
who began to be recruited as mechanics, operators and electricians. By
the end
of the war Indians were employed in all jobs that were being done
earlier by
Europeans, the exception being ciphers, which was not opened to Indians
until Independence. Though IOR were now doing the same job as
BOR, there was considerable disparity in their status – BOR did not
salute
Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers (VCOs) - salaries, rations and living
conditions. This naturally irked the Indians, who saw no reason for this
discrimination.
A seemingly inconsequential cause
for discontent was the bad quality of gur (jaggery) being supplied to
the troops by resorting to local purchase. This had been officially reported to
the Centre Headquarters on 25 February 1946. However, the decision on the
complaint or the progress was not communicated to the men. On 26 February a
number of notices were seen pasted on the company notice boards in the lines of
the Demob Centre and No. 4 Depot Company. Some notices had ‘Jai Hind’ written
on them, while others called upon all Indian Other Ranks to cease work and, if
necessary, shed blood. The notices were
seen in the morning by Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Anderson, Officer Commanding
Indian Signals Depot, who reported this to the Commandant, Colonel R.T.H.
Geltson. Viewing the situation as serious, Colonel Gelston immediately sought
an interview with the Area Commander, to report on an ‘Intelligence’ matter. At
3 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel Anderson met the Area Commander
and apprised him of the notices. In the evening, all officers were called for a
conference and explained the developments. At about 6 pm all IOR of Records
were paraded and the Company Commander, Captain DS Garewal, addressed them, in
the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Anderson and the Officer in Charge Records,
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald. The men were calm during the address, and
there was no untoward incident.
The mutiny started at about 9.20 am
on 27 February 1946 in ‘G’ Company of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion. The
first works parade was held at 7 am as usual, and the men were drilled. All
officers attended the parade which ended at about 8.30 am, when everyone broke
off for breakfast. Soon after breakfast, about 200 men, mainly workshop
trainees, formed up in the lines of the unit, just before the second works
parade was due to fall in. Most of them were in uniform, carrying flags of the
Congress and Muslim League. They formed a procession and marched out of the
unit, shouting slogans of ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. The Senior
Viceroy Commissioned Officer of the unit, Subedar Major and Honorary Captain
Ahmed Khan, asked them to halt, but they did not listen to him. Khan
immediately telephoned the Adjutant, who was having breakfast in the Officers
Mess. The Adjutant told the Subedar Major that Major C.C. Tucker, the
officiating Commanding Officer, had left the mess about five minutes earlier
and he should await his arrival in the office. He also informed Major D.C.
Dashfield and Captain J. Knowles, Company Commander and Training Officer
respectively of ‘G’ Company, who were in the mess with him. Collecting another
officer, Captain M.B. Myers, they left for the unit area on bicycles.
Information about the crowd
collecting and shouting slogans in front of the guard room of No 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached Colonel Gelston, whose office was located
just a hundred yards away. Gelston saw
the crowd leave the unit area and move along Peter’s Path, which led towards
No. 3 Signal Training Battalion and the Signals Depot. He telephoned the Area
Headquarters and also the Depot, warning them that that the crowd might come
that way. The Depot Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, was then in his
bungalow. When Gelston rang him up, he told him that he had called for a 15-cwt.
vehicle and was planning to come to his office, to report that notices had
again been seen during the morning parade. Gelston informed Anderson of the developments, and asked him
to pick him up from his office, so that they could both go and see what was
happening.
Meanwhile, the procession was
proceeding on Peter’s Path, along Napier
Road to the lines of No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion. Major Tucker was cycling to his office when he met the crowd. Having
failed in his attempt to stop them, he cycled ahead and warned No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion of their approach. The four officers of No. 2 Signal
Training Battalion had also reached the unit, and the Adjutant telephoned No. 3
Signal Training Battalion. Major Dashfield and Captain Knowles got into a 3-ton
lorry and drove towards the crowd al full speed. Having been warned of the
approach of the procession, No. 3 Signal Training Battalion had turned out its
guard. But the crowd brushed it aside, and entered the unit area, sweeping
Major Tucker off his bicycle. When Major Dashfield and Captain Knowles caught
up with him, he ordered them to go after the crowd and halt them. Noticing that
the crowd was about to leave 3 Signal Training Battalion near the Boys’
Company, they halted the truck and went towards the mob. When Major Dashfield
asked them to stop, one of them said, ‘we have demands’. Captain Knowles, who
had his back towards the crowd, was hit three times by stones. Enveloping the officers,
the crowd continued on its way.
Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant
Colonel Anderson reached the crowd as they were coming out of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion. They were soon joined by Major Dashfield and Captain
Knowles. The four officers got out of their vehicles and tried to stop the men,
who just rushed past them and marched through the Depot. They were very excited
and seemed completely out of hand, shouting slogans and waving party flags.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson kept moving with the head of the column while
Colonel Gelston got in the truck and asked the driver to start. The truck was
soon surrounded by the mutineers and some even tried to get in. Gelston ordered
the driver to keep moving forward slowly. At one stage the driver’s foot slipped
off the pedal and the truck bounded forward, knocking over two men. Due to the
heavy rush, even Anderson
was almost run over. After this, the truck was stopped and Anderson got in. Both officers then made
their way to the Depot.
Realising that they would not be able to stop
the procession on their own, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson collected about15 men
and issued them with rifles. He also armed Dashfield and Knowles with pistols
and the party moved in a lorry towards the procession, which had already passed
through the Depot. Overtaking the crowd on the Outram Road about 200 yards from the
Nerbudda Junction, they halted the lorry with the men keeping their rifles at
the aim. The officers dismounted and Anderson
threatened to shoot if the men did not stop. Hearing this, the men in the crowd
bared their chests and dared him to open fire. The three officers were
literally thrust out of the way and the crowd turned off the Nerbudda Road towards Gorakhpur and headed for the city.
Two Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
of ‘G’ Company followed the crowd and attempted to fid out their complaints.
The main grievances of the men were: 4
·Differences
in pay between IORs & BORS.
·Poor
quality of rations.
·Why
was fire opened on RIN ratings?
·Why
were two INA officers sentenced to seven years RI when others were merely cashiered?
Undeterred by the attempts to stop
them the crowd proceeded towards the city. Having reached Tilak Bhumi, Tillaya,
they stopped and held a meeting, where speeches were made by some of the men
highlighting their grievances. There was a lot of slogan shouting and waving of
flags of Congress and Muslim League. Some of them went to the local office of
the Congress Party and sought the help of the local political leaders. An
officer from the Intelligence Branch of Area Headquarters and some officers
from the Signal Training Centre also went to the venue in civil dress and noted
down the names of the prominent persons taking an active part in the meeting
and discussions.
The news of the incident spread
quickly. There was considerable tension in the city and shopkeepers closed
their shops. However, the meeting was peaceful and there was no violence or
unruly behaviour by the men. At about 4.15 pm they started back for the unit.
By this time the military authorities had mobilised two companies of 27 Jat and
two ID (Internal Disturbance) companies of the Signal Training Centre in case
force was required to carry out arrests. But the crowd entered the lines
peacefully and sat down in the battalion area. The troops earmarked for
effecting arrests were therefore asked to stand down. The ID companies, which
had taken over the main guard, kot (armoury) and magazine guard were
later relieved by the Jat troops. The ‘ring-leaders’, whose names had been
noted down by the Area Intelligence Officer and by other officers from Signal
Training Centre, were asked to fall out when their names were called, which
they did without any protest. Major C.C.
Tucker, the officiating Commanding Officer of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion,
ordered a Viceroy’s Commissioned Officer to march the ringleaders to the main
quarter guard. Sensing what was going to happen next, the others pulled them
back into the crowd.
Soon afterwards, the Commandant,
Colonel L.C. Boyd arrived, followed by the Area Commander, who addressed the
men. He told them that they were all under arrest, but assured them that he
would forward their grievances to higher authorities. They fell in and were
marched to the Signal Training Centre Cage where the Commandant noted down
their demands, which were as under:- 5
·Increase of basic pay
·Increase of rations
·Better accommodation
·Equal treatment with British Other Ranks
·Speedier demobilisation
·Protest against speeches of the Commander-in-Chief and
Admiral Godfrey - the passage that if Indian Army soldiers are indisciplined
every force would be used against them
·Release of all INA prisoners including Captain Rashid and
Burhanuddin.
·Unnecessary to spend one crore on Victory celebrations when
there is food crisis in India.
·Ready to work if the demands are put forward. We did no
indiscipline while out. Pray no action against us.
After taking down their grievances
the Commandant spoke to the men and left. When the afternoon parade was
dismissed a number of men of No. 2 Signal Training Battalion approached the
cage and started milling around shouting words of encouragement. Those who
wished to join their friends inside the cage were allowed to do so and the rest
were ordered to return, which they did. After dark the same thing occurred. The
men inside the cage refused food and bedding. When the Commandant came to know
of this he entered the cage and spoke to the men, after which they agreed to
eat food and accepted bedding. Apart from sporadic slogans, the night passed without
incident.
By
early next morning, a British battalion, the Somerset Light Infantry had
arrived in Jubbulpore. A party of about 80 men
from No. 2 Signal Training Battalion assembled in the unit at 7 am and began
moving along the same route that had been taken by their colleagues on the
previous day, but before they could cover any substantial distance, they were
intercepted by a platoon of the British battalion. When addressed by various
officers, a few of them agreed to return to work but the remainder were left on
the roadside under the guard of British troops.
At
9 am No. 2 Signal Training Battalion was paraded. Major Tucker and Colonel Boyd addressed the
men and asked to return to work. Though the men remained orderly they refused,
saying that they could not do so because their comrades were in custody. If
they were let out, they would all go back to work. They were asked to return to
their lines and remain quiet, which they readily agreed to do. At about 10 am
personnel of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion became restive, and about 100 men
joined the clerks of the Records and sat down with them, demanding the release
of the men inside the cage. Some officers and Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
tried to talk them out of this demand, but very few responded. A few men from
the ID companies who had been asked to stand down took off their equipment and
joined the crowd.
The District Commander, Major General Skinner
arrived to get a first hand account of the events. In consultation with the
Area Commander and the Commandant Signal Training Centre, a plan was made to
arrest the ringleaders. The officiating Commanding Officer and the Subedar
Major would enter the cage to reason with the men and try to effect the arrests
placidly. If this were to fail, then the ringleaders would be pointed out to
the Company Commander of the Somerset Light Infantry, who would make the
arrests forcibly. Major Tucker, Lieutenant Waugh and Subedar Major Khan entered
the cage and reasoned with the men for over an hour without success. The
Second-in-Command of 27 Jat and Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose, an Indian officer
who had been called from Katni, then entered the cage and spent another hour,
but failed to induce the ringleaders to give themselves up. There was no
recourse left except the use of force.
About
80 soldiers of the Somerset Light Infantry entered the Cage, with bayonets
fixed on their rifles. A few of the men were physically removed, amidst a lot
of shouting. Faced with the bayonets of the British troops, the crowd retreated
to one corner of the cage, which gave way under the weight of sheer numbers. A
large number managed to escape through the gap, while the remainder were
involved a scuffle with the British troops. Many sustained injuries from
bayonets and some were trampled in the stampede. The injured were immediately
removed to the hospital. Some of the men who escaped rushed towards the city
but others who were very frightened hid in huts in the lines or in the local
countryside. Information about the escapees was conveyed to the police and the
civil authorities, with a request to arrest them and bring them back at the
earliest.
The
news of the bayonet charge spread like wild fire in the Signal Training Centre
and at many places the men came out and demonstrated against this, resulting in
some more arrests. At 6 pm 14 men returned voluntarily, followed by some more
in smaller groups of two or three. They were all placed under arrest and put in
the guardroom. At about 7.30 pm information was received from the local police
that about 200 men who had been rounded up by them were being returned in
police lorries. The District Commander and Commandant Signal Training Centre
met these men when they arrived. The injured were sent to the hospital while
the rest were sent to the Jat lines. Meanwhile, about 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion continued to sit
in the Records lines.
While events had taken a serious
turn in the Signal Training Centre on 28 February 1946, things were far from
normal in the Depot and Records. In the morning about 200 clerks of the Records
collected near 4 Company lines and marched towards the Depot Battalion. The
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, turned out his Internal
Defence Company and followed them, accompanied by his Second-in-Command and
Captain D.S. Garewal of Signals Records. They met the crowd of mutineers on the
bridge near the Indian
Military Hospital.
A column of the Somerset Light Infantry had also arrived and was lined up on
the Outram Road
opposite the hospital. Lieutenant Colonel Anderson spoke to the men and asked
them what they wanted. On being told that they had several grievances he asked
them to return to their lines and hand over their grievances, which he promised
to take up with the authorities. After some hesitation they agreed and followed
him to the lines, where they sat down and narrated their grievances, which were
noted down and handed over to the Area Commander when he arrived soon
afterwards to address the men.
Lieutenant Colonel Anderson again spoke to the men and asked them to
return to work but they refused.
A company of the Somerset Light
Infantry had been placed around the lines of No. 4 Company. With the help of
some British soldiers, the Brigade Major of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade, Major K.B.
Langdon, arrested four Indian Other Ranks who were then marched away. After
these arrests and the departure of the Area Commander, about 100 men of No. 3
Signal Training Battalion rushed into the 4 Company lines and joined the
mutineers, accompanied by a lot of shouting.
Lieutenant Colonel C.M. Macdonald, the Officer-in-Charge Records and
Captain Macfarlane, Adjutant No. 3 Signal Training Battalion tried to quieten
the men. After about ten minutes the newly arrived recruits sat down behind the
mutineers already seated there. Some more officers from No. 3 Signal Training
Battalion arrived and tried to persuade their men to return to their lines but
failed. The total number of mutineers present in No.4 Company had now swelled
to almost 350. The Commandant Indian Signals Depot and Records, Colonel Gelston
spoke to them about their grievances and promised to do all that could be done
to remove them. The men also demanded the release of the four men arrested
earlier and the removal of British troops. At 4 pm the British troops were
withdrawn without any visible reaction from the mutineers. The night of 28
February passed off without any further incident.
In the early hours of 1 March 1946,
about 150 Other Ranks from 3 Signal Training Battalion left their lines and
marched in a procession towards Sadar Bazar, shouting slogans and waving flags.
This information was conveyed to Area Headquarters, which ordered a company
from Somerset Light Infantry to proceed to the garrison ground, where the crowd
was reported to have be headed for. At 7.30 am the Commanding Officer,
Lieutenant Colonel R.B.S. Eraut, the Adjutant, Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar
Natesan, a Madrassi Mussalman interpreter, proceeded to the Garrison Ground but
found no trace of the procession. Colonel Eraut went to the Area Headquarters,
while Captain Facfarlane and Jemadar Natesan searched for the crowd in the city
and the cantonment, without success. On their return to the unit they
discovered that 24 men from the Internal Disturbance Company had joined the
procession. The Commanding Officer ordered the Internal Disturbance Company to
stand down, and the British guard to take over.
At about 9 am information was
received that the procession was coming back in an endeavour to mobilise the remainder
of the unit. The Commanding Officer positioned a few officers and Viceroy’s
Commissioned Officers to meet the procession when it reached the lines and
divert them to the football ground. The Commandant reached the unit shortly
before the arrival of the procession at 9.45 am. Efforts to guide them to the
football ground failed and they moved towards the staging camp. They were
stopped en route and the Commanding Officer began to address them. At first he
was shouted down but eventually succeeded in making them sit down and listen.
The Commandant then addressed the men and listened to their points. Since it
was the morning break the rest of No. 3 Signal Training Battalion also gathered
round to listen. After the Commandant left for the Area Headquarters, the
Commanding Officer ordered the unit to parade for normal work. This order was
not immediately obeyed but after about twenty minutes all the men less the
demonstrators returned to work. At about 11.30 am Lieutenant Colonel Poonoose
arrived and addressed the men for over an hour, after which a few of them
returned to work. It appeared that many more were willing but were being
prevented by the leaders.
At about 13.15 pm the Subedar Major
reported to the Commanding Officer that the demonstrators were requesting
permission to go to the cook house and have their food, and promised to return
to normal duties after that. The Commanding Officer agreed making it clear that
the normal course of military law would be followed. Shortly after this the
Subedar Major accompanied by 11 men left for the Records lines in order to
persuade the party of mutineers from No. 3 Signal Training Battalion who were
sitting there to return. He came back after 30 minutes and reported that he had
not only failed in convincing the mutineers but had lost two men of this party,
who had been persuaded to join them. After lunch, all the men except for those
still in Records attended the afternoon works parade.
The situation in No. 4 Company of
Records on 1 March continued to be tense. Captain Garewal, the Company
Commander attended the first works parade at 8 am and found only two men
present. The mutineers were still sitting between the first and second
barracks, where they had been the previous day. Most of them were seated in orderly
ranks, with a few standing around and talking. At about 10.30 pm they became
noisy and began to form a procession, taking down several Congress and Muslim League
flags from the open ground between the barracks and the road where they had
been erected the previous day. However, there were many among them who shouted
to the men to stay in the lines, and the procession broke up into small
groups. At about midday the flags were
re-erected. Shortly afterwards a deputation led by the Subedar Major of No. 3 Signal
Training Battalion arrived to persuade their men to return. There was a heated
discussion followed by a lot of pulling and pushing, and some men were
physically prevented from going back.
At the second works parade, not a
single man fell in on the parade ground. The Officer-in-Charge Records was
informed that some men would go to work individually but were afraid to come to
the parade ground. At about 4.15 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose arrived and met the men. Poonoose spoke to men with all officers
present, and later alone. At 5.45 pm, Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose left to meet the Area Commander. At the Roll Call parade at 6 pm, 41
men were present. The rest of the men were still sitting between the two barracks,
but were quiet.
The previous day’s incidents had
been reported in several newspapers and there was considerable resentment at
the bayonet charge on the Indian soldiers. According to the newspapers, three
men had been killed, while 70 were injured in the bayonet charge. The District
Magistrate, Mr. E.S. Hyde declared Jubbulpore Cantonment a restricted area, and
the entry of civilians was banned. Notices to this effect were pasted at
prominent places and also announced by the beat of drum. Headquarters
Jubbulpore Area had also issued instructions confining all troops to lines.
Another infantry battalion, the First Royal Gurkha Rifles (1 RGR) had also
arrived.
On 2 March 1946, Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose again spoke to the mutineers in Records and No.3 Signal Training
Battalion. He reported that he had failed to make any headway and found that
some men who had appeared to be amenable the previous day were now obdurate.
During the day, a message from Major General F.H. Skinner, General Officer
Commanding Nagpur District was read out to all ranks, in English and Urdu.
Making it clear that the action of the men who had collectively absented
themselves from their lines without permission amounted to mutiny, it went on
to assure that there would be no mass punishment and ‘justice would be tempered
with mercy’. The message also appreciated the conduct of those who had remained
staunch to their duty in the ‘face of provocation and bad example’.6
During the day, conditions improved.
In No. 2 Signal Training Battalion, all men reported for the first works parade
except for nine, who also reported after half an hour. In No. 3 Signal Training Battalion all men resumed
duties except for the 100 men in Records and those detained in the Jat lines.
Major Dashfield visited the Jat lines with some Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers
and tried to bring back some of the men, but they refused to come unless the
ringleaders were released as well. Colonel Gelston and Lieutenant Colonel
Poonoose visited the mutineers in Records in the morning at 7.30 am. Poonoose
spoke to them for about half an hour but found them in the same frame of mind.
He noticed that some men whom he had spoken to the previous day were missing,
and suspected that they had been forcibly prevented from attending his talk.
At 12.30 pm, Captain Garewal read
out the District Commander’s message, twice in Urdu and once in English, using
a pubic address system. Everyone heard this in silence. During the afternoon,
all was quiet and there was no shouting of slogans. At the evening roll call,
268 men were present. At 9 pm, the
mutineers announced that they were willing to end the mutiny. They burned their
flags and started reporting at the office, where their names were noted down.
The 100 men of No. 3 Signal Training battalion returned to their lines. By 11
pm, it appeared that all mutineers had surrendered, except the ones in the Jat
lines.
On 3 March 1946 a roll call parade
was held in all units at 9 am. Immediately afterwards some ringleaders were
arrested and sent to the Jat lines. Troops of 17 Indian Infantry Brigade had
placed a cordon around the lines. The Area Commander and Commandant Signal
Training Centre visited the mutineers in the Jat lines. They said that they
were willing to come back if all of them were released. The ringleaders among
them had been segregated and without them the others refused to return to their
units. During the next two days, the situation improved, but was still far from
normal. The men in the Jat lines refused to come out until their leaders were
released. There were no incidents on 4 and 5 March and normal parades were held
in the units. On 7 March all the men in the Jat lines returned. On reaching
their units they staged a protest for the release of the ringleaders,
threatening to go on strike again if this was not done. However, the threat did
not materialise and there were no untoward incidents after 7March
1946. The mutiny was over.
The
mutiny had shocked the military establishment, especially the British officers
who had always believed that the Indian soldier would never rebel. The reasons
for the disaffection were quickly analysed and remedial measures taken. The
District Commander issued instructions to all concerned to improve the standard
of food and accommodation. Lieutenant Colonel Cassani from the Welfare
General’s Branch visited the lines of the Indian Signals Depot on 6 March 1946
and submitted a detailed report at General Headquarters (India). The
report brought to light the pathetic conditions under which the Indian troops
lived. After it was found that some officers, Viceroy’s commissioned officers
and non commissioned officers had spent almost eight to ten years at Jubbulpore, those who had been there for over two years
were immediately posted out. The number of Indian officers was increased, so
that they could understand the problems of Indian troops.
Disciplinary action taken against those who
participated in the mutiny was severe and swift. Those against whom there was
even the slightest inkling were punished. Most of them were charged under
Indian Army Act Section 27 (a) – ‘joining, exciting, causing or conspiring in a
mutiny’ – and Army Act Section 27 (b) – ‘being present at a mutiny and not
using his utmost endeavours to suppress the same’. A total of 85 men were found to have been
actively involved in the mutiny. Eighteen men were tried by Summary General
Court Martial, of which 15 were sentenced to dismissal and imprisonment ranging
from one to three years, with three being acquitted. Seven men were dismissed
without trial and 19 discharged without terminal benefits. In addition, 41 were
discharged from service on
administrative grounds – services no longer required - without any enquiry or investigation. Many
more were sent home merely on suspicion and the statements of Viceroy’s and non
commissioned officers that were considered loyal by British officers. Most of
these men had put in long years of service and fought in World War II. They did
not get any pension or gratuity and many lived and died in penury. Their pleas
for redress fell on deaf years as instructions were also issued not to
entertain any petition or appeal unless Army Headquarters recommended it. Old
records contain several letters that bring out the pathetic state of these
unfortunate soldiers, who remained true to their salt and helped the British
win the Second World War. Having implicit faith in the British sense of fair
play and justice, they were surprised and disappointed at the treatment they
received at the hands of the Government of the day.
Though
bad food and living conditions were the major reasons behind the mutiny at Jubbulpore, it had a political tinge right from the
beginning. The firing on the naval ratings at Bombay and the punishments awarded to the
officers of the Indian National Army were included in the list of grievances
given by the mutineers on the first day itself. Throughout the revolt, the
participants carried flags of the Congress and the Muslim League and shouted
slogans such as ‘Jai Hind’ and ‘Inquilab Zindabad’. On 27 and 28 February they
contacted local political leaders and sought their help. The local Congress
leaders visited the mutineers under detention in the Jat lines and persuaded
them to give up their resistance. They were shown a letter from Maulana Azad,
the Congress President, asking them to resume work.7
During a press conference on 3 March 1946, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru referred o the Jubbulpore mutiny, and said, ‘…the men ... have
remained completely peaceful…The demands were for better treatment in regard to
rations, amenities etc, and equality of treatment between Indian and British
soldiers. There were also some political demands… Such demands should not
normally be made on the basis of a strike… We have seen recently strikes by
American and British servicemen’.8
Seth Govind Das of the Congress Party raised the
matter in the Central Assembly in Delhi
on 15 March 1946. In his reply, the War Secretary, Mr. Philip Mason gave the
official version of the case. According to him, 1,716 persons were involved in
the mutiny. He accepted that thirty-five persons had been wounded of whom eight
had bayonet wounds with remainder having minor injuries from barbed wire or
contusions. Only two persons were seriously injured and there were no deaths.
However, he denied that there was any firing or bayonet charge. According to
him, some persons had sustained bayonet wounds when they attempted to overpower
the troops that had been called in to arrest the ringleaders. Mr. Ahmad Jaffar
of the Muslim League suggested that a couple of members of the Defence
Consultative Committee should be associated with the Inquiry, but this was
rejected by the War Secretary, who contended that this was a service inquiry
under the Indian Army Act, and it would be quite illegal to associate
non-officials. 9
The
Army mutiny at Jubbulpore followed the
mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force and the Royal Indian Navy. It is
pertinent to remember that one of the compelling reasons for the departure of
the British from India
was the apprehension that the loyalty of Indian Armed Forces was doubtful. Due
to obvious reason, the staunchness of the Army was more worrisome than that of
the other two services. On 5 September 1946, in a note by the
Commander-in-Chief on the military aspects of the plan to withdraw from India, General
Auchinleck was to record, ‘The importance of keeping the Indian Army steady is
emphasised. It is the one disciplined force in which communal interests are
subordinated to duty, and on it depends the stability of the country. The steadiness of the R.I.N. and the R.I.A.F.
is of lesser import but any general disaffection in them is likely seriously to
affect the reliability of the Army.’10
The
mutiny in the Signal Training Centre and the Indian Signal Corps Depot and Records
at Jubbulpore was only major uprising in the
Indian Army after the end of World War II. It was also the last uprising by
soldiers under the British Raj. In a sense, it was the proverbial ‘last straw’
that broke the camel’s back. Fearful of the effect it might have on the rest of
the Army, news about the mutiny was deliberately suppressed. Having occurred in
a small town, it was almost ignored by the national newspapers based in Delhi and Bombay.
The Corps of Signals also chose to ignore the mutiny, even after Independence, and old
timers talked about it only in hushed voices. Many officers were worried about
the stigma associated with a mutiny, which has always been regarded as the most
heinous of military offences. The fact that the Corps of Signals continued to
be headed by a British officer up to 1954 may have played a part in this.
Strangely enough, no record of the Jubbulpore
mutiny exists in the National Archives or the Historical Section of the
Ministry of Defence. As a result, it has been ignored by military historians as
well those who have written about the freedom struggle. The men involved in the
mutiny have also suffered – unlike the participants in the naval mutiny, they
have not been classified as freedom fighters.
The Royal Air Force Mutiny of 1946 was a mutiny on dozens of Royal Air Force stations in India and South Asia in January 1946 over conditions of slow ....
Royal Indian Air Force mutiny
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Royal Air Force Mutiny of 1946 was a mutiny on dozens of Royal Air Force
stations in India and South Asia in January 1946 over conditions of
slow demobilization and conditions of service following the end of World War II. The mutiny began at Karachi and later spread to involve nearly 50,000 men over 60 RAF stations in India and Ceylon, including the then-largest RAF base at Kanpur and RAF bases as far as Singapore.[1]
The mutiny lasted between three and eleven days at different places and was peaceful. The main grievance of the men was slow demobilization of British troops to Britain, use of British shipping facilities for transporting G.I.s, and other grievances. For their part, the British Government argued that the provisions were inadequate.[clarification needed]
However, later declassified reports have shown that British troops were
retained in India to control possible unrests over the course of the independence movement, and the grievances of the RAF men may have also included significant political views and communist support.[1]
The events of the RAF mutiny were ultimately resolved, and some of the mutineers faced courts-martial. However, the precedent set by this event was important in instigating subsequent actions by the Royal Indian Air Force and later, the Royal Indian Navy in February 1946 in which 78 of a total of 88 ships mutinied. Lord Wavell, Viceroy
of India, commented at the time: "I am afraid that [the] example of the
Royal Air Force, who got away with what was really a mutiny, has some
responsibility for the present situation."[2]
Field
Marshal Viscount Wavell to Mr Attlee (via India Office), Telegram,
L/PO/4/28: ff 66-7. Sent 24 February 1946, 4.50 pm at New Delhi, appears
in The Transfer of Power in India, 1942-47, Volume 6, Page 1055 edited by Nicholas Mansergh, published by Foreign & Commonwealth Office (London, 1976).
Childs, David (2000), Britain Since 1945: A Political History, Routledge, ISBN0-415-24804-3.
John W. Cell, in Reviews of Books; Asia. White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India by Peter Stanley. The American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 3. (Jun., 1999), pp. 888–889.
.=============================================== British help to Pakistan in Kashmir
1946-see below:-
did they just run away from India?
no
1-they caused the establishment of anti India Pakistan with a British paid lawyer stooge called Jinnah
2-the caused the blood shed due to partition
3-they supported their illegal child called Pakistan then and now
==============================================
Northern Command in India was a pre-war formation, with its
headquarters located at Rawalpindi. It comprised the:
Peshawar District;
Kohat District;
Rawalpindi District;
Lahore District;
Waziristan District.
On the 21 April 1942, it was redesignated as the North Western
Army. The Lahore District transferred to the newly formed
Central Command, and the Rawalpindi District was absorbed by the
Army Headquarters.
In November 1945, it reverted to the title of Northern Command and
the Rawalpindi District was reformed. When Central Command
was disbanded circa June 1946, the Lahore Area and Sind Brigade
came under command.
On the 15 August 1947, with the partition of British India,
Headquarters Northern Command formed the new Headquarters, Pakistan
Army. .this shows British help to Pakistan to establish their army in 1946
Feb 7, 2011 - In 1946, after Gilgit, William Brown served briefly in the Tochi Scouts, ... He assumed that somewhere within the British military establishment there were .... read about Major William Brown who led the Gilgit Rebellion in 1947.
In
July 1948 William Brown was awarded the MBE (Military) with a citation
so unspecific that it was not clear what lay behind this acknowledgement
of his merits. He assumed that somewhere within the British military
establishment there were those who approved of what he had done in
Gilgit to ensure that this region went to Pakistan rather than to India.
He was only too aware that there were other leading British figures,
not least Lord Mountbatten, who were far from pleased by his
intervention in the affairs of the post British Subcontinent.
William Brown felt deeply attached to Pakistan and did not wish to leave the country.
THE GILGIT REBELLION 1947 By William A. Brown
I
have posted this book because it is an important source from the point
of view of giving a true state of events and the persons relevant to the freedom of Gilgit and Baltistan in 1947-48.
PREFACE
[William Alexander Brown, 1922-1984]
William
Alexander Brown, Willie to his friends, was born in Melrose in the
Scottish Borders on 22 December 1922. His father, William Neilson Brown,
had served with distinction in the Gordon Highlanders during World War
I, and had been awarded the Military Cross. His grandfather, Alexander
Laing Brown, had been Liberal MP for the Border Burghs from 1886 to
1892. The Brown family had played a prominent part in the development of
the woollen trade in the Borders: they were responsible for building
some of the first mills in Selkirk, Galashiels and Hawick.
William
Brown was educated at St Mary’s Preparatory School, Melrose, and George
Watsons College, Edinburgh. In April 194l, on leaving school, he
enlisted in the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
In
December 1941 he sailed for India. Here, he attended the Officer Cadet
training unit at Bangalore and was then commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant
into the 10/12 Frontier Force Regiment. He transferred almost at once
to the Frontier Corps of Scouts and Militia, serving initially in the
South Waziristan Scouts on the Afghan border of the North Western
Frontier Province. He soon became proficient in Pushto, the language of
the Pathans.
In
early 1943 William Brown was posted to the Gilgit Agency where he spent
the next three years, for a time serving as Assistant Political Agent in
Chilas (when he was responsible for the construction of the Chilas Polo
Ground still in use today). He travelled widely throughout the Gilgit
Agency in Hunza, Nagir, Yasin, Ishkoman, Punial and Guh Khizr, gaining
experience which was to stand him in good stead when he had to facethe
Gilgit crisis of 1947 which is described in detail in this book. While
in the Gilgit Agency during this time he learnt Shina the lingua franca
of the region, as well as some Burushaski, the language of Hunza. Some
impression of his first time in the Gilgit Agency is conveyed in Chapter
1 of this book.
In
1946, after Gilgit, William Brown served briefly in the Tochi Scouts,
based in North Waziristan, and then in June 1947 he was posted to
Chitral as Acting Commandant Scouts there.
In
Peshawar, enroute for Chitral, he was told by Lt.—Colonel Roger Bacon,
then Political Agent in Gilgit, that the Viceroy Lord Mountbatten, had
decided (for reasons which were not clear to Bacon and which are still
not clear) that the 1935 British lease of the Gilgit Agency fiom the
Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir (a lease which still had 49 years to
run) was going to be terminated andthat the Agency, with a 99%
Muslim population, was going to be returned to the Hindu rule of the
Dogra Maharaja Sir Hari Singh. The actual transfer would take place,
Colonel Bacon told him, on 1 August 1947 two weeks before the recently
announced end of the British Indian Empire on 15August. It was
put to him that he would be a suitable candidate for the position of the
Commandant of the Gilgit Scouts during and after this period of
transition. William Brown while fully appreciating the difficulties and
dangers involved, and angry that the British could so callously return
without any preparation or warning the Muslim people of the Gilgit
Agency to by no means congenial Hindu rule, volunteered for the task
even though it meant leaving the British service and become in effect a
mercenary employed by the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir.
After
a very brief period in Chitral the position of Commandant of the Gilgit
Scouts was indeed offered to him. He accepted at once. He was given the
acting rank of Major. On 29 July 1947 he arrived in Gilgit just in time
to witness the formal handover on 1 August, when the British flag was
lowered and that of Jammu & Kashmir raised in its place. Colonel
Bacon, the last British Political Agent, departed: his place was taken
by Brigadier Ghansara Singh the representative of the Maharaja of Jammu
& Kashmir.
What
followed between August 1947 and January 1948, when William Brown was
finally withdrawn from Gilgit (now part of Pakistan), is described in
considerable detail in Chapters II to V of this book. One must always
remember that when these events took place William Brown was only 24 or
25 years old (he celebrated his 25th birthday in Gilgit). One must also
remember that once William Brown had embarked upon the process which
resulted in the Gilgit Agency declaring for Pakistan he was technically
in a state of mutiny against the Government of State of Jammu &
Kashmir. Had he been captured by the Maharaja’s forces, he would almost
certainly have been put to death, as he well knew.
After
his return from Gilgit in 1948, William Brown was transferred to the
Frontier Constabulary, the police force of the North Western Frontier
Province (by now, of course, of Pakistan) in which he served in various
capacities for the next two years.
In
July 1948 William Brown was awarded the MBE (Military) with a citation
so unspecific that it was not clear what lay behind this acknowledgement
of his merits. He assumed that somewhere within the British military
establishment there were those who approved of what he had done in
Gilgit to ensure that this region went to Pakistan rather than to India.
He was only too aware that there were other leading British figures,
not least Lord Mountbatten, who were far from pleased by his
intervention in the affairs of the post British Subcontinent.
William
Brown felt deeply attached to Pakistan and did not wish to leave the
country. He sought therefore, some position there in commerce after
leaving the Frontier Constabulary. Sir George Cunningham, formerly
Governor of the North West Frontier Province (and who figures in this
book, as the reader will see), obtained for him a position in Imperial
Chemical Industries (ICI) as a Sales Executive. Unfortunately, in this
capacity his first posting was for Calcutta in India. During his time in
Gilgit William Brown had evidently made a number of determined enemies
among the Sikhs, perhaps because of his involvement (described in the
book) in the destruction of the Sikh component of the 6th Kashmir
Infantry in Bunji. In Calcutta he was set upon by Sikhs and left for
dead in the street. Miraculously he was found by a doctor and he
recovered. He was then posted to Karachi in Pakistan.
In
early 1957 William Brown met Margaret Rosemary Cooksley, who was serving
with the UK High Commission in Karachi. They married. In 1958 a son,
William, was born.
William
Brown was a keen sportsman. While at school he had become a good
marksman, having shot at Bisley where he captained the school team.
When; with the War, cartridges became scarce, he became interested in
falconry. While in Gilgit, the local national game of polo captured his
enthusiasm and he became very skilled at it: he had already become a
superb horseman. In later years in Karachi he played polo using at times
Gilgit tactics which did not always win universal approval. Also in
Karachi William Brown took up racing as an armature jockey and as a
trainer, in both capacities with some success.
During
these Karachi years he did not lose touch with the mountains of the old
Gilgit Agency. He became the local secretary for Pakistan of the
Himalayan Society and helped many expeditions coming to Pakistan to
climb in the Karakorum, Hindu Kush, Pamir’s and Himalaya.
In
1959 William Brown and his family returned to the United Kingdom. He
felt that the day of the expatriate in the commerce of the subcontinent
was passing and that it was time to head for home. As by this time he
could not imagine a life without horses, in 1960 he established livery
yard and riding school, Glenside Stables, in the village of St Boswells
in the Duke of Buccleuch’s Hunt country. Here he remained respected as
teacher and judge of horses for the next twenty-four years. During this
time there were four more children Frances, Timothy Katy and Helen.
On 5
December 1984 a week before his 62nd birthday, William Brown died after a
sudden heart attack. Few of his wide circle of friends had appreciated
quite what an impact on the history of South Asia he had had during his
time in Gilgit in 1947 and early 1948 since he never spoke of his
adventures in those days they were surprised when accounts of the Gilgit
Rebellion the subject of this book, appeared in obituaries in The Times, The Daily Telegraph and various local Border newspapers. Indeed itwas
only after his death that the full truth about what he had achieved in
Gilgit made his enormous contribution to the future success of Pakistan
began to come to light. Hitherto for a variety of reasons, which need
not concern us here, there had been a tendency to minimise, ifnot
ignore entirely, his part in the great events of 1947 which are the
subject of this book. In the end, justice to his memory was to some
measure, done with the awarding, on Independence Day 1993, of the medal
Sitara-i-Pakistan as a posthumous recognition by Pakistan of his great
contribution. His widow Margaret received the medal in Islamabad from
the hands of President Leghari on Pakistan Day, 23 March 1994.
William
Brown is buried in Benrig churchyard, in the heart of the Border
country, which he had loved so much. On his gravestone is engraved the
Ibex head badge of the Gilgit Scouts and the legend, DATA KHEL. 31.10.47
(the significance of which will become apparent to the readers of this
book).
A
word about this book. William Brown kept a diary until at least until
his return from Gilgit in January 1948. The actual diary has been lost
(apparently it was stolen) but at some point before 1950, probably as
early as 1948, William Brown wrote it up in narrative form, perhaps
intending to publish it. In the end it was not published and the top
copy was lost. A carbon copy however, survived. This is what is
reproduced below. There has been the absolute minimum of editorial
interference. A few pages have been omitted, mainly because they digress
from the main thrust of the narrative. Spelling has, we hope, been
standardised and there have been minor alterations in schemes of
punctuation. Otherwise, this is what William Brown wrote when the events
described were still fresh in his mind after the passage of no more
than a year or so and with his diary before him. In many ways it is a
unique document, the story of an adventure of a kind which William Brown
may well have been the last Briton to experience in the Indian
Subcontinent with the passing of the British Raj. It was an adventure,
moreover, which changed the course of history to an extent that few
other individuals can have achieved. Without William Brown it is more
than likely that in the end the Gilgit region would have passed into the
hands of India. Pakistan would have been cut off for ever from Central
Asia. India would have been in direct contact with Afghanistan, in many
respects at least, is hostile to Pakistan as ever India has been. What
would the fate of Pakistan have been in I best, circumstances?
Many people helped in the preparation of this memoir for the press. We
would particularly like to thank Shah Khan for his assistance in the
verification of material relating to the Gilgit region in the years
1947-48. Crown copyright material from the British Library (India office
Records) is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her
Majesty’s Stationary Office.
I
am Emma Brown, daughter in law of Margaret Brown, who thanks you for
your response and who also sends on her regards. Indeed she has
frequented Hunza on many occasions and has always spoken so dearly of
the place and the people. I am glad to hear that it has been a genuine
misunderstanding and it is also nice to see that you have the same
passion about the book as we do. We are however in the process of
designing a website and having the book available to be downloaded as
well as hopefully a reprint in hard copy. We would therefore ask if you
could please remove the book from your blog - Margaret is happy for you
to keep the preface, but not the rest of the contents online. We are
hoping to re-publish the book in the near future with extra content - as
since the first publication there have been so many friends of
'Willies' who have come forward with more information, which we are in
the process of compiling. Obviously, with your passion we would welcome
any thoughts you have, as ultimately our aim is to bring the story to a
new generation. I shall keep you posted as we get everything up and
running. Kind Regards Emma
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................ The Original Himalayan Blunder: How India Lost Gilgit-Baltistan ...
The original Himalayan Blunder was with regard to the
Gilgit Agency and the Wazarat, which many don’t even remember.
Gilgit-Baltistan, as we know it today comprised Gilgit Agency and Gilgit
Wazarat back in 1947.
A lot has been written about the Himalayan Blunder committed by India
in 1962. Even more has been written about the blunders committed in the
prosecution of the Kashmir War of 1947, notably the reference to the United Nations by Jawaharlal Nehru at a time India was gaining momentum in the war.
Poonch had been secured. Enemy forces had been chased away from the
outskirts of Leh and Kargil had been won back. The Poonch-Uri road had
been secured. India only needed a last push to capture Skardu back and
take Muzaffarabad and Mirpur.
History would also tell you that Jammu and Kashmir was also the only
princely state which was not under the charge of Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel. Kashmir was a separate Ministry under the Government of India and was directly under the charge of Prime Minister Nehru.
I would not labour the oft repeated events that pre-dated the accession of Kashmir to India.
I begin at the point of accession.
Field Marshal Manek Shaw
There is a fine account by Late Field Marshal Manek Shaw
who was then the Director of Military Operations in the Army HQ in the
rank of a Colonel. General Sir Roy Bucher, the C-in-C of the Indian Army
sent him to accompany VP Menon who was flying to Srinagar to get the
Instrument of Accession signed.
The Kabaili tribals were hardly 10-12 kms away from the Srinagar airfield. They came back on 25th
Oct, and it is worth recalling in Manek Shaw’s own words what happened
the next morning in a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee: “At the morning meeting he handed over the (Accession) thing.
Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me
Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave
him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops
immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would
take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we
couldn’t fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper.
He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it
away’. He (Nehru) said,’ Of course, I want Kashmir (emphasis in
original). Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your orders’. And before he
could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got
your orders’. I walked out, and we started flying in troops at about 11 o’clock
or 12 o’clock. I think it was the Sikh regiment under Ranjit Rai that
was the first lot to be flown in. And then we continued flying troops
in. That is all I know about what happened. Then all the fighting took
place. I became a brigadier, and became director of military operations
and also if you will see the first signal to be signed ordering the
cease-fire on 1 January (1949) had been signed by Colonel Manekshaw on
behalf of C-in-C India, General Sir Roy Bucher. That must be lying in
the Military Operations Directorate.”
One more event of great momentous consequence had already taken place.
Maharaja’s forces broadly comprised 50 per cent Muslims and 50 per cent Hindus. Manek Shaw records that the Muslim elements of Maharaja’s forces had revolted.
This position was known both to the Army and the political
leadership. However, they got so busy looking after Srinagar that they
forgot completely about both the Gilgit Agency and the Wazarat.
A bit of background may be called for at this point.
The princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as opposed to J&K of today), had five main regions – Jammu with Jammu as HQ, Kashmir with Srinagar as HQ, Ladakh with Leh as summer HQ, and Skardu as winter HQ, Gilgit Wazarat with Astore as HQ, and Gilgit Agency on a 60 year lease to the British from 1935.
Gilgit Agency comprised Chilas, Gilgit, Yasin, Ghizr, Iskoman, Humza
and Nagar valley. All areas east of Bunji were in the Wazarat which was
directly administered. As the Great Game was unfolding in Central Asia,
and Britain was getting more and more obsessed with the threat of
Communist Soviet Union, they thought it fit to administer this part of
Maharaja’s State directly and accordingly took it on lease in 1935.
As the Indian Independence Act was passed by the British Parliament
on 13 July 1947 and the date of transfer of power to India and Pakistan
was set to 15 August, Mountbatten decided to let go of the Gilgit Agency lease.
On the 1st of August, administration of Gilgit passed back
into the hands of Maharaja, a responsibility he was simply not up to
discharging. He had a British Chief of Army Staff, Major General
Scott. Scott had just two battalions around Gilgit. A battalion of
Gilgit Scouts which was a British force and another battalion of 6,
Kashmir infantry stationed around 50 kms away at Bunji on the eastern
bank of Indus in the Wazarat area.
Gilgit Scouts was a 100 per cent Muslim force. It had one HQ Company
stationed in Gilgit and ten platoons contributed by the various Rajas. 6th
Kashmir infantry at Bunjion the left bank of Indus had 2 Dogra and Sikh
companies and one Muslim company. General Scott sought a British
officer to command the Gilgit Scouts as the force was 100 per cent
Muslim and a Hindu might find it difficult to command it, and for
obvious reasons, a Muslim could not be trusted in the situation that
prevailed.
So Scott marshaled his resources and got a British Captain who was
then posted in Chitral, and also accepted his recommendation to have
another British officer working under him at Chilas. The biggest advantage that Pakistan had over India in Kashmir
was that there was not a single road or rail route that connected India
with J&K. Srinagar was accessed from Rawalpindi, through Murrie and Muzaffarabad (The road to Muzaffarabad bye-passes Murrie today).
Poonch road was through the town of Gujrat after crossing the Chenab
at Wazirabad. Even the road to Jammu was Amritsar-Sialkot-Jammu. Jammu
had a light railway too. It ran from Wazirabad Junction on the main
Lahore-Rawalpindi line through Sialkot to Jammu. Gilgit and Skardu were
both accessed through Rawalpindi-Abbottabad road which crossed into
Gilgit agency at the 4200 metre Babusar pass and joined the Indus at
Chilas.
If the Babusar pass was closed due to snow, then there was the
alternative route along the Indus valley which is the present alignment
of the Karakoram Highway.
From Chilas, the road went through Bunji upto the place where
GilgitRiver joins the Indus, from where Indus upstream goes further
north until it hits the Karakoram Range and turns south south-east near
Sassi.
It went on to Skardu, from where another road along Indus, Shingo and
Suru valleys joins up with Kargil. The other route took off from the
Gilgit-Indus confluence and went up to Shandur pass in the West from
where it crossed into Chitral, a Muslim princely State.
The river Hunza meets the Gilgit River at Gilgit. The road along
Hunza valley led to the vassal States of Hunza and Nagar. The present
Karakoram Highway is along this alignment going further into Chinese
Turkestan over the Khunjerab pass. The Gilgit-Indus confluence has the unique geographical
feature of three of the greatest ranges – Himalayas, Karakoram and
Hindukush meeting at one place.
The route from Jammu to Gilgit and Skardu via Srinagar was open only
during summers as it was not possible to cross the Pir Panjal during
winters. Also, going to Gilgit Wazarat’s capital Astore involved
crossing the rivers Sind and Kishanganga, before going up to the Burzil
Pass through Mini Margh.
Map of Jammu and Kashmir
Even the flights in small turbo prop planes had to first go to
Peshawar from Srinagar before refueling and taking the route up along
the Indus valley.
It is here that the big blunder took place.
Major William Alexander Brown, the commander of the Gilgit Scouts had
one singular merit, not unlike many other Englishmen. He kept a diary.
This was later published as his memoirs.
A look through the memoirs reveals his mindset. Right from day one of his taking over as Commander at Gilgit, he had a political agenda.
When the lease of Gilgit Agency was prematurely terminated by
Mountbatten and Maharaja formally resumed his territory, Major Brown was
inducted as an officer of the Kashmir and Jammu Army.
Brigadier Ghansara Singh of the Maharaja’s Army was sent in as the
Governor. Brown derides him as incompetent and lazy. Brown’s memoirs
cannot be taken at their face value as he was always scheming against
the Maharaja. In early September, he had decided to support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. He has mentioned in his diary that he had his mind made up that in case Maharaja decided to accede to India, he would be with his Muslim soldiers and would mount a mutiny.
Brigadier Ghansara Singh did not size up the situation well. The 6th
Kashmir Infantry based at Bunji had 3 battalions, one of which was a
Muslim battalion. Everyone knew how Muslim battalions had deserted the
Kashmir forces in the various mutinies which occurred from Poonch to
Muzaffarabad to Baramula. Gilgit Scouts had an unconventional formation
of an HQ company and ten platoons. These were widely distributed at
Gupis, Chilas and Gilgit.
After the accession had been achieved and Indian troops had taken
control, Gilgit should have been immediately secured through an air
bridge as was Srinagar. Had Gilgit been secured, every other garrison in Gilgit
Baltistan would have become safe including Skardu and Ladakh Agency.
This blunder was committed as much by the Kashmir Army, as by the Indian
Army and India’s political leadership.
Gilgit had a small air strip which could have taken small aircrafts,
but Skardu had a fairly long airstrip. An airlift of the size which
occurred in Srinagar was militarily not possible, but induction of
Indian Army and its commanders was an urgent imperative.
As things transpired later on, Major Brown led the mutiny of Gilgit
Scouts as he had intended to, right from November onwards. The Kashmiri
Governor, Brigadier Ghansara Singh was arrested by Major Brown. The
Muslim company of 6th Kashmir Infantry also mutinied, as they had already been compromised by Major Brown.
The remainder of the 6th Kashmir Infantry were chased away from
Bunji, Pakistan flag was unfurled at Gilgit on 1st November, 1947 and
for 3 weeks Gilgit was an independent entity till Pakistan sent its
Governor there. Thus the way was opened for the whole of Gilgit and a
major part of Baltistan to be occupied by Pakistan.
Major Brown directed the entire operations into Gilgit-Baltistan
until he was relieved in January 1948. After the fall of Gilgit, every
man in Kashmir knew that Skardu would be the next target. Gen. Thimayya is on record that he considered Skardu to be the last frontier in the battle to save Ladakh.
Yet, no airlift occurred till the Kashmir Forces in Skardu under that
great soldier Sher Jung Thapa had been besieged in February by Gilgit
Scouts and Chitral Bodyguards.
This failure to resupply and relieve the garrisons at Gilgit and
Skardu immediately after the airlift of Srinagar were great military
blunders, besides political ones.
A sagacious Army commander, which General Sir Roy Bucher probably
was, should have proceeded to defend Skardu and Gilgit through an air
bridge. We are, however, not sure how much of his heart he had in this
war.
Pakistanis similarly blame General Sir Douglas Gracey, the Pakistan
Commander-in-Chief. It was a great error of judgment on part of Maharaja
to entrust his forces to English officers, and to place trust in Muslim
companies and battalions when they were deserting everywhere.
The hero of Skadru Lieutenant Colonel Sher Jung Thapa
The saga of rape and murder of Indians in Bunji and Skardu
need to be retold to all the Indians today so that they would know how
Pakistan forces fight, and how misplaced their sense of fair play is
when it comes to Pakistan, whether with their forces or their public.
Narendra Modi and Doval have sized up the situation correctly. I am
sure that if it had been Modi and Doval in 1972, they would not have let
the advantage of having 90,000 POWs melt away without wresting away
some major part of Pakistan, or without breaking up Pakistan. A War Crime Tribunal would have broken up Pakistan at that time.
My two bits about the present situation is that this great Ummah feeling has completely disappeared from Gilgit-Baltistan today. Shias and Ismailis are persecuted, and Sunnis are being increasingly seen as a colonizing force.
We need not have any illusions about the population in these parts,
but it is certain that the way to conquer Kashmir is not through
Muzaffarabad, but through Khapalu and Skardu. This is true not only in
territorial terms, but also in terms of minds of people.
David Cameron and Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari
agreed yesterday to improve co-operation between their two governments
in the battle against terrorism.
The two leaders met at a time
when it is feared that the monsoon floods in Pakistan, and the
government's perceived failure to mount an effective relief operation,
are generating support for Islamist groups in the Pakistani countryside.
Mr Cameron and President Zardari appeared side by side after an
hour's meeting at Chequers, having gone some way towards smoothing over
the diplomatic ruckus caused by Mr Cameron's remarks in India last week,
when he publicly accused elements in Pakistan of exporting terror. His
comments caused the Pakistani head of security to cancel a planned visit
to London, but yesterday the two leaders had warm words for one another
– at least in public.
Mr Cameron said: "The President and I have been talking about what we
see as an unbreakable relationship between Britain and Pakistan.
Whether it is keeping troops safe in Afghanistan or keeping people safe
on the streets of Britain, that is a real priority for my Government,
and somewhere where, with Pakistan, we are going to work together in
this enhanced strategic partnership."
Standing at Mr Cameron's side, Mr Zardari said: "This is a friendship
that will never break, no matter what happens. Storms will come and
storms will go, and Pakistan and Britain will stand together and face
all the difficulties with dignity and we will make sure that the world
is a better place for our coming generations."
Later, when interviewed for the BBC's Newsnight, Mr Zardari added:
"We've lost more soldiers than the world put together. I've lost my
wife. We've lost our workers, my personal friends, my personal workers
of the party who are like kids to us. We've lost them to this war. So I
don't think anybody doubts our intentions on this war. But there can
always be weaknesses which need to be strengthened, yes. There are
weaknesses in both sides that need to be worked upon, and Pakistan needs
more resources."
Downing Street said that to enhance security in both countries, it
was agreed that Britain's national security adviser, chief of defence
staff and intelligence officers should have "regular discussions" with
their Pakistani counterparts, and once a year there will be a "security
summit" involving the Prime Minister and either the President or Prime
Minister of Pakistan. Mr Cameron has also accepted an invitation to
visit Pakistan, though no date for the trip has been set. The Home
Secretary, Theresa May, will visit in the autumn.
A formal statement issued by the two leaders after their meeting paid
tribute to Pakistanis who risked their lives fighting terror. "The
Prime Minister recognised the sacrifices made by Pakistan's military,
civil law enforcement agencies and people in fighting violent extremism
and militancy and appreciated the efforts of the democratic government.
Both leaders appreciated the close co-operation that already exists
between respective police forces and other security agencies."
Discussing economic relations, the president emphasised that Pakistan
would rather have trade than aid, and Mr Cameron, in return, promised
that Britain would be the biggest ally in Pakistan's attempts to gain
better access to EU markets.
Mr Zardari has been heavily criticised by opposition MPs in Pakistan
for being out of the country at a time of national emergency. "It was
disgusting to see Zardari going on a joy ride when people here expected
the President to stand with the nation at its hour of grief," said Ahsan
Iqbal, of the main opposition party led by former prime minister Nawaz
Sharif.
On Newsnight, Mr Zardari defended himself, saying that in Pakistan it
is the Prime Minister who should direct relief work. "I am the one who
is given all the powers from the presidency to the parliament," he said.
"The parliament is in session. Senate is in session. It's the Prime
Minister's responsibility and he's fulfilling his responsibility." ============================================================================ Winston Churchill AND HIS HATRED OF INDIA
Sure everyone knows that Winston Churchill tried to keep India in the
British Empire in the 1930s and that he developed a real grudge against
Mahatma Gandhi calling him ‘a half-naked fakir’ and a ‘seditious Middle
Temple lawyer.’ However, what most people don’t know was that one of
the dimensions of Churchill’s argument for keeping India within the
Empire was his defence of Muslim civil rights.
Punch Cartoon of Winston Churchill and his ‘Indian Problems’
Clearly, Churchill’s connection to prominent Indian Muslims had a
major impact on his views of Indian independence. While Churchill’s
opposition to Indian independence was not completely motivate by Muslim
civil rights (he was still a Victorian imperialist after all), as an
issue it certainly help characterize, and may have been an attempt to
legitimatize his views on them British Empire in India. Winston Churchill had some kind of secret agreement with Jinnah – a joint plan to create Pakistan. ‘Churchill had thought of giving Jinnah his Pakistan, and the Nizam,
Hyderabad, as well as the chief princes[Travancore ,Bhopal,and etc] their respective States as
independent territories under British protection’ Mountbatten was ‘the Viceroy who came to India to divide and quit’
The British: Churchill/ Attlee/ Mountbatten Long before any organized movement for independence,
the British motto (‘divide-and-rule’)
had already been in operation. In 1888, or a mere
three years after the formation of the Congress
party, as an organ for an Indian point of view
on Britain’s governance, the founder of
the party denounced “the British attempts
to promote Hindu-Muslim division by fostering
‘the devil’s … dismal doctrine
of discord and disunion’.” The Congress
party-founder was not an Indian but a liberal
Scot, namedAllan Octavian Hume.
Churchill hated India [“I hate Indians.
They are a beastly people with a beastly religion”].
Wavell, the immediate predecessor of Mountbatten,
also noted the same about Churchill and added
that “[Churchill] knew as much of the Indian
problem as George III did of American colonies”
[in 1776, before US Declaration of Independence;
George III was the British monarch then].
Most of Churchill’s venom was, however,
reserved particularly for Gandhi and he used it
liberally and often. Among his many personally
vicious comments on Gandhi, Churchill had this
to say in Parliament [when Gandhi arrived in Delhi
to meet Irwin in 1931] : “It is alarming
and nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious
Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fakir of
a type well known in the East, striding half-naked
up the steps of the Viceregal palace, while he
is still organizing and conducting a defiant campaign
of civil disobedience, to parley in equal terms
with the representatives of the king Emperor.”
In 1943, Churchill, after seeing Roosevelt off,
said to Kenneth Pender, US vice-consul to Marrakech:
“Now Pender, why don’t you give us
Morocco, and we shall give you India. We shall
even give you Gandhi, and he’s awfully cheap
to keep, now that he’s on a hunger strike
… There are always earnest spinsters in
Pennsylvania, Utah, Edinburgh or Dublin, persistently
writing letters and signing petitions and ardently
giving advice to the British government, urging
that India be given back to Indians, and South
Africa back to the Zulus or Boer, but as long
as I am called by His Majesty the King to be his
First Minister, I shall not assist at the dismemberment
of the British Empire.”
Lord Wavell records Churchill’s response
of 5 July 1944 to Wavell’s telegram for
aid to the starving in Bengal: “Winston
sent me a peevish telegram to ask why Gandhi hadn’t
died yet! He has never answered my [Wavell’s]
telegram about food.” When Wavell met Churchill,
as the WWII was winding down, he records this
in his journal (29 March 1945): “The PM
then launched into a long jeremiad about India
which lasted for 40 minutes. He seems to favor
partition into Pakistan, Hindustan, Princestan,
etc.” In this, Jinnah and Churchill thought
alike.
Two years before partition,
Andrew Clow admitted that it was the British who
had contributed to make Pakistan a live issue.”
In 1945, William Phillips, a representative of
the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) urged
the US State department to publicly support the
Britian-Congress-League settlement. When the US
Secrtary of State, Edward Stettinius, urged Churchill’s
Foreign Minsiter Anthony Eden (later a PM himself)
how granting India its independence would improve
the Allied prestige in the Far East, Eden “doubted
that India’s problems can be resolved as
long as Gandhi was alive,” according to
Kux.
In the first post-WWII British general elections
(1945), Churchill who had successfully fought
Hitler, was defeated by the Labor Party by a huge
margin. Clement Attlee, a Labor party leader and
a liberal and a socialist, who in 1940, joined
the coalition war-time cabinet/government headed
by Churchill during the war, was the one who defeated
Churchill. For the next six years, he was vigorous
in carrying out reforms, nationalization many
service (and introduced National Health Service)
and granted freedom to India and Burma, to which
he and the Labor had long been committed. A person
who was “admired” even by as staunch
a conservative as Maragret Thatcher - “he
was all substance and no show,” in her book
‘The Path f Power,’ 1995.
Prime Minister Attlee’s mandate of February
1947 to Viceroy Mountbatten was to secure a peaceful
‘transfer of power’ (a British preference
for ‘independence’) “the closest
and most friendly relations between India and
the UK. A feature of this relationship should
be a military treaty.” But, in what has
been described as his ‘unseemly haste’,
Mountbatten failed to achieve one of the key components
of this mandate: a military alliance with either
India or Pakistan (only Ceylon/Sri Lanka agreed
to have British bases). However, these countries
agreed to remain within the Commonwealth. Loss
of India was a major blow to the British Empire
and its position as a world power (Among those
who commented on India being the key to the British
empire’s power, Lord Curzon: “Take
away India, and Britain would become a second-rate
power.”).
Lawrence James thinks the post-partition massacre
could have been avoided. Mountbatten’s reactions
to the bloody aftermath of partition were, according
to his biographer, Philip Ziegler, “at his
most shallow.” Mountbatten claimed later
he tried “to minimize the scale of the disaster”
and that it “had surprised him [Mountbatten].”
But Ziegler, reminding the escalation of violence
since August 1946 states, “Military intelligence
knew that it could worsen. Aware of this, [Field
Marshall] Auchinlek [Commander in Chief in India]
had wanted to keep British troops behind after
Independence, but had been over-ridden by Mountbatten.”
In the same biography, Ziegler also says: “Senior
military men in India, including Auchinlek, were
critical of Mountbatten. Lieutenant
General Sir Reginald Savory, Adjutant-General
of the Indian Army, accused him of having “tried
to make it appear to India and the world and to
ourselves that we were committing a noble deed.”
The Oxford History of British Empire (Judith M.
Brown And Wm. Roger Louis, eds.) is also quite
critical of Mountbatten: His main motive seems
to be “expediency and the urge to further
his reputation,” and refers to his “megalomania,
his self-serving accounts and his doctoring of
historical records” as part of the premise.
US
Till 1941, US presence in India (then a British
colony) was very limited, and that business was
conducted through Britain (between US-British
embassies), and the official US presence in India
was restricted to consular offices in a few cities
(Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Karachi), with no
diplomatic presence in the Indian capital, New
Delhi. However, concerned over military expansionism
from Japan in WWII, the US opened its diplomatic
relations with India just a month before Pearl
Harbor (November, 1941). When, after taking over
Malaya and Burma, Japan was threatening India,
FDR sent his personal envoy Louis Johnson in April
1942 to help in Britain’s problems in India.
Churchill (then British PM) had offered limited
encouragement to Congress but refused ‘transfer
of power’ to India during WWII. Though the
Muslim League was supportive of the Allied war
effort, Congress was NOT. Congress did not support
the British plan either (presented by Sir Stafford
Cripps). FDR blamed the failure of the Cripps
Mission on “the British unwillingness to
concede to the Indians the right of self–government”
(in a cable to Churchill, 11 April 1942), but
FDR couldn’t press Churchill anymore. India’s
partition “sounded terrible” to FDR.
Even after Independence, the State Department
was not warm towards Pakistan.
Outside India, the press was generally wary. In
a series of articles, in the New York Times (1942–1943),
Herbert Matthews described the growing role of
Jinnah/Muslim League: In “Jinnah Holds the
Key to Peace in India” ( 4 October, 1942),
he wrote “… a new figure has arisen
and he holds in his hands more power for good
or evil than any single politician. It’s
that tall, thin, exasperatingly deliberate man
who seems to be taking pleasure at keeping the
world guessing –--Mohamed Ali Jinnah. In
his delicate hands lies the answer to the riddle:
‘Can Hindus and Muslim Agree?”
“Time” magazine was particularly harsh
on Jinnah: The 22 April 1946 cover story showing
a grim Jinnah with the caption “His Muslim
Tiger Wants to eat the Hindu Cow,” commented
that “the Indian sun casts Jinnah’s
long thin shadow not only across the negotiations
in Delhi but over India’s future.”
It’s not probably well-known but Kux says
in his book, the US had about 350,000 troops stationed
in India during WWII, supposedly as ‘quartermasters
and engineers’ in Bengal and Assam, fearing
a Japanese attack. They were politically neutral
and took no sides in the India-Pakistan debate.
The US was more concerned about Britain granting
independence to India, rather than India after
independence.
History of India
A-2-Z GK: Modern India
HUNZA DEVELOPMENT FORUM: THE GILGIT REBELLION 1947 By William A. Brown
/ Attlee
/ Mountbatten
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